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THE EFFECTS OF CHOICE AND EGO-INVOLVEMENT ON CONFIDENCE
JUDGMENTS
Jonathan H. Chow, MA
University o f Nebraska, 1999
Advisor: Dr. Lisa Scherer
Studies on confidence judgments have generally shown that people are
overconfident about their abilities or knowledge, and their confidence judgments are not
well calibrated. The purpose of this study was to contribute toward a more precise and
defensible version o f how motivational factors interact with cognitive biases to influence
confidence judgments. Review of the effect o f choice on confidence judgments suggests
an avenue to study the joint effect of motivational factors and cognitive biases on
confidence judgments. In particular, the study investigated how motivational factors such
as ego-involvement interact with cognitive biases involved in making choices to increase
overconfidence in general knowledge questions. In the present study, the degree o f egoinvolvement was manipulated through information provided about the nature of the task.
Participants either assessed confidence judgments on their chosen alternatives (choice
condition) or assessed confidence judgments on the precircled alternatives (arbitrary cue
condition). Results indicated that arbitrary cue participants were more overconfident than
choice participants. The influence of ego-involvement, however, was undetectable. Egoinvolvement was found to moderate the effect of choice on confidence judgments,
however, in the opposite direction of the prediction. In the high ego-involvement
condition, arbitrary cue participants exhibited higher overconfidence than choice
participants. There was no significant difference between arbitrary cue participants and

choice participants in the low ego-involvement condition. Implications of the findings
and suggestions for future research are discussed.
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The Effects of Choice and Ego Involvement on Confidence Judgments
Overview of the Problem
In organizational contexts and in everyday life, the process of judgment and
decision making is inherently predicated on one’s ability to evaluate evidence and assess
confidence in predicting outcomes of future events. Many of the decisions people make
are critical. Whether the decision deals with what surgical procedures to perform, whom
to hire for a job, or where to invest a million dollars, the outcome of any of these
decisions can potentially have a profound impact on an individual or an organization.
Moreover, decision makers lacking confidence in their judgments may fail to take
necessary actions, resulting in missed opportunities. On the other hand, overconfident
judgments can lead to erroneous choice and disastrous outcomes. For instance, strategic
planning and decision making are dependent on predictions of what will happen in the
relevant environment of a business. Forecasts are some of the important judgments made
in organizations. Organizational performance will suffer if overconfidence is observed in
forecasts. If managers rely too heavily on the supposed accuracy of a forecast, they may
devote fewer resources to monitoring the environment, neglect contingency planning, and
even misperceive or ignore signals that the future is evolving contrary to expectations.
Do people have accurate knowledge o f what they know, how well they perform,
and their ability to make the correct decision? The issue of how to evaluate evidence and
assess confidence has been researched experimentally for the past three decades. Studies
o f judgment under uncertainty have generally indicated that people are overconfident
about their abilities or knowledge, and their confidence judgments are not well calibrated
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). The implication of the overconfidence
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phenomenon is important in two respects (Yates, 1990). First, it implies that “our
decisions are plagued by inaccuracy of our judgments” (Yates, 1990, p. 95). A physician,
for example, may select the wrong treatment, a manager may select the wrong applicant,
or a stockbroker may select the wrong investment if their confidence judgments are
inaccurate. Second, it contends that “individuals who exhibit overconfidence in their
decisions are less likely to recognize the need to improve their judgments” (Yates, 1990,
p. 95). Without realizing the need for improvement in one’s decision making process, one
will continue to make the same mistake repeatedly. Therefore, it is essential to fully
understand this phenomenon of overconfidence to determine how to reduce the
probability of making potentially suboptimal, if not disastrous decisions.
The purpose of the study is to examine how motivational factors interact with
cognitive biases to influence confidence judgments. Review o f the effect o f choice on
confidence judgments suggests an avenue to study the joint effect of motivational factors
and cognitive biases on confidence judgments. In particular, this study deals with the
prediction of how motivational factors such as ego-involvement interact with cognitive
biases involved in making choices to increase overconfidence in general knowledge
questions.
The aspect of judgment accuracy that has received the most attention from
research is the area of calibration. Calibration is defined as the ability to use judgments
that are “appropriately qualified according to how sure the person is that the target event
will happen” (Yates, 1990, p. 57). The following discussion provides an overview of
calibration studies and examines the confidence judgment research in the domain of
general knowledge questions.
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Overview of Calibration Studies
A typical calibration study requires the participant to answer multiple choice
questions that test general knowledge or predict outcomes of future events. The format
for almost all of the studies follows a two-stage procedure (Yates, 1990). The participant
first indicates which of the two options is correct, then states a probability confidence
judgment that the chosen option is indeed correct. The calibration of judgments is
measured by grouping each o f a set of confidence judgments into categories assigned to
the same subjective probabilities. For each category, the experimenter calculates the
percentage of the questions that participants answered correctly. In addition, the mean
response is plotted against the percentage correct for each category. Calibration simply
refers to the extent to which the subjective confidence closely matches the relative
frequency of correct answers. Evidence of poor calibration exists when the subjective
confidence of a given category differs from the relative frequency of the correct events
within that category. The participant is called overconfident for categories in which
reported confidence exceeds percentage correct, and underconfident for categories in
which reported confidence is less than the percentage correct. Perfect calibration occurs
when questions assigned a confidence o f 70% are correctly answered 70% o f the time
and when events assigned a confidence of 90% occur 90% of the time. If this were true,
we say that the individual’s probability judgments are well calibrated. The conclusions
drawn from the calibration studies have shown that confidence often exceeds accuracy.
This phenomenon has been observed in a wide range of conditions and in many different
domains (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips,
1982; Oskamp, 1965; Winkler & Murphy, 1968;). The following section reviews in
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greater detail the existing empirical evidence o f the overconfidence phenomenon. In
particular, we will note the parameters and implications of overconfidence in general
knowledge studies.
Overconfidence in General Knowledge Questions
The most consistent evidence o f overconfidence has emerged in general
knowledge, almanac question studies. Examples of a general knowledge question would
be “Which City is farther south: (a) Rome or (b) New York?” or “Which city has more
people: (a) Des Moines or (b) Santa Barbara?” Participants then pick one of the answers
and assess the probability of that chosen answer being correct. Numerous studies using
general knowledge questions have shown the effect of overconfidence (Fischhoff, Slovic
& Lichtenstein, 1977; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Yates, Lee, & Shinotsuka, 1996).
Lichtenstein and Fishhoff (1977) found participants’ probability judgments are prone to
systematic biases, especially overconfidence. Fischhoff et al. (1977) studied the
appropriateness of the expressions of confidence and found participants were Consistently
overconfident across various response formats and questions. Overconfidence regarding
general knowledge has been observed across various response formats and elicitation
techniques (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982; Fischhoff et al., 1977; Ronis & Yates, 1987).
The overconfidence phenomenon, although relatively robust, is not universal in
all tasks and for all items. A substantial amount of research has shown that
overconfidence is subject to a number of factors. The most commonly discussed
moderator of overconfidence is item difficulty. In most cases, difficulty is defined on the
basis o f the performance of participants. Analysis has revealed that overconfidence and
poor calibration are exaggerated for difficult tasks and items, ones that are answered
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correctly by relatively few people. In fact, the overconfidence effect is minimized and
even turned into systematic underconfidence for easy tasks and items, questions that
almost everyone answers correctly. This result is termed the hard/easy effect
(Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). In a study o f discriminating between European and
American handwriting, Asian and European children’s drawings, and rising and falling
stock prices, Lichtenstein and Fishhoff (1977) observed that overconfidence was
drastically reduced as tasks get easier. Additional analyses revealed that individuals who
answered more items correctly exhibited less overconfidence in general. In other words,
they found a systematic decrease in overconfidence as the percentage correct increased.
Other studies have also replicated the finding to show that participants who are more
accurate exhibit better calibration and less overconfidence than those who are not as
accurate.
In addition to item difficulty, overconfidence is also moderated by the expertise of
the individual (Keren, 1987; Murphy & Winkler, 1984). Keren (1987) conducted a study
involving a group of expert and nonexpert bridge players in a natural environment of a
bridge tournament. After the bidding phase of each game, but prior to when the actual
play began, players were asked to assess the likelihood of the final contract being made at
each round. The two groups showed significantly different results in regard to their
probability judgments. The calibration of the expert group was clearly superior to the
calibration of the nonexpert group. The nonexpert group showed overconfidence in their
probability judgments. Murphy and Winkler (1984) replicated the finding when they
observed that professional weather forecasters exhibit much better calibration and less
overconfidence than laypersons in making weather forecasts. In summary, there are clear
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circumstances where overconfidence in judgments consistently occurs. On the other
hand, there are also situations where overconfidence is hardly ever observed (Keren,
1987; Murphy & Winkler, 1984). Therefore, the extent to which overconfidence is likely
to occur and under what specific circumstances is worthy of examination.
Plausible Causes of Overconfidence
In examining the overconfidence literature, the essential question with respect to
the causes of confidence errors has received very little attention. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff,
and Phillips (1982) criticized overconfidence studies, portraying them as examples of
“dust-bowl empiricism” (p. 333). They contend that psychological theories and
explanations for results were often absent in most overconfidence research. In reference
to the current research, there are at least two plausible explanations of overconfidence.
Cognitive biases are commonly offered explanations of overconfidence. The
overconfidence phenomenon has been explained as a characteristic of human information
processing (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). An alternative explanation is a
motivational one. An extensive literature on self has suggested a motivation factor that
drives many self-processes and underlies a variety of cognitive and behavioral responses,
the drive for favorability. People generally tend to hold positive and somewhat inflated
views of themselves whenever possible. It is plausible that this drive for favorability may
have accounted for the observed overconfidence phenomenon (Yates, Lee & Shinotsuka,
1996).
Cognitive biases. People generally have the tendency to discredit and explain
away information that may disconfirm a hypothesis they hold, or they may simply engage
in a biased information search for confirming evidence for their hypothesis. The
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phenomenon of cognitive bolstering of the chosen course of action has been intensively
investigated by social psychologists. According to Janis and Mann (1977), not only does
this cognitive bolstering phenomenon occur after commitment is made, but is also at
work in people who are trying to make a personal decision before the commitment phase.
The characteristic manifestations of bolstering (oversimplifying, distorting, evading, and
omitting major considerations bearing on the less acceptable alternatives) are exhibited
by those who are in the process of making decisions (Janis & Mann, 1977). These types
of bolstering characteristics are likely to become sources for overconfidence. Research on
reducing overconfidence in decision making has shown that requiring participants to
justify their answers to a group of other participants significantly reduced the amount of
overconfidence in judgments (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987; Koriat et al.,
1980). As suggested by Koriat et al. (1980), biased search for confirming evidence prior
to choice as well as biased search after choice may contribute to this phenomenon of
overconfidence. In their study, overconfidence was drastically reduced for participants
who were asked to write down all the reasons they could think of that would support or
contradict either of the two possible answers before they recorded their selection and
assessed the probability. The same finding was replicated in Arkes et al.’s (1987) study in
which requiring participants to justify their choice of alternatives to a group of other
participants significantly reduced the amount of overconfidence in judgments. Overall,
the appropriateness of confidence is determined in part by the extent to which an
individual searches for confirming and disconfirming evidence for each of llie
alternatives.

Motivational factors. There is no doubt that people seek to find some positive
basis for self-esteem, to think well o f themselves. Self-esteem theories contend that
people desire to enhance the positivity of their self-conceptions or protect the self from
negative information (Baumeister, 1995). For example, people will seek out and focus on
information that has favorable implications for the self and avoid information that has
unfavorable implications to the self. The bias toward overly positive self-evaluation has
been replicated across a wide range of research tasks and conditions. In a review, Taylor
and Brown (1988) contend that the three phenomena that have consistently emerged from
numerous studies of self are unrealistically positive views of the self, exaggerated
perceptions of personal control, and unrealistic optimism. It is quite possible that these
very biases of overly positive self-evaluations are present in evaluations of one’s
performance in decision-making tasks.
In the following section, I will review overconfidence studies that specifically
dealt with the prediction of how motivational factors such as self esteem/ego involvement
interact with cognitive biases to increase overconfidence in general knowledge questions.
The inconsistency in this line of research is noted.
Effect of Choosing on Confidence
The discussion which follows begins with the review of three studies that directly
examine the effect pf choice on confidence judgments. In the first study, Sniezek, Paese,
and Switzer (1990) investigated the effects of choice and framing techniques on
confidence judgments. The second study conducted by Ronis and Yates (1987) dealt with
consistency and effects of subject matters and assessment method on confidence
judgments. Finally, in an attempt to provide an alternative explanation for the
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aforementioned studies, Scherer and De La Castro (1998) examined the interactive effect
of choice and responsibility on confidence judgments.
Sniezek et al. (1990) examined the effects of choosing an alternative and framing
on formation of confidence in choice. Participants were 104 undergraduate students.
Participants in the choice condition were asked to choose between two alternatives in a
general knowledge questionnaire. Then participants stated a probability confidence
judgment from .50-1.00, that the chosen alternative was correct. The same procedure was
repeated in both the arbitrary cue condition and uncued condition with the following
exceptions. In the arbitrary cue condition, participants read each item and rated the
probability that the arbitrarily precircled alternative was correct (alternatives were
arbitrarily precircled in an alternating sequence). In the uncued condition, participants
were instructed to read the item and then rate the probability of answering the item
correctly without actually answering the question. These researchers predicted that
explicit choice between alternatives would lead to greater confidence in choice.
Specifically, going back to the proposition of Koriat, et al. (1980), information search is
biased toward the evidence supporting one’s preferred alternative. With respect to this
proposition, the explicit selection of an alternative would bias information search, and as
a result, lead to overconfidence. In addition, an overt choice is likely to promote personal
commitment to the selected alternative as opposed to passively judging the probability of
an arbitrarily preselected alternative. As personal commitment increases with explicit
choice, individuals will be more motivated to seek out confirming evidence in support of
their overt choice. It is assumed that the search for and the evaluation of evidence
following an explicit choice would be biased by personal commitments to one’s choice.
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To summarize, when self is the agent of selection, as in the case of choice condition, the
motivational factors of self should interfere with normal cognitive processing of
information, thereby resulting in greater overconfidence.
In addition to choice, these authors examined the effect of framing on confidence.
Two versions o f elicitation statement were employed in this study to manipulate the
effect of framing. Participants were instructed to estimate the probability o f being correct
in the positive elicitation frame condition, and the probability of being wrong in the
negative elicitation frame condition. According to these authors, framing could lead to
overconfidence through two routes. First, positive elicitation statement could induce
participants to agree with the proposition, and this would ultimately lead to
overconfidence. Second, framing could lead to overconfidence through biased generation
of evidence prior to choice or selective attention to confirming evidence after choice.
Emphasis on the probability of a chosen answer being wrong has the potential effect of
reducing biases toward generating confirming evidence prior to choice and evaluating
evidence following choice. Therefore, confidence was predicted to be lower in negative
elicitation condition due to reduction of cognitive biases.
The Sniezek et al (1990) study, however, found the opposite results. Contrary to
the prediction that choice contributes to overconfidence, the effect of selection was found
to be significant for the overconfidence measure in the reverse direction. Participants in
the choice condition were less overconfident than participants in the two no-choice
conditions. Arbitrary cue participants showed more overconfidence than the other two
conditions. Although all three conditions exhibited overconfidence, confidence ratings
were more appropriate and accurate for participants who explicitly selected an
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alternative. Additional analyses also revealed that participants who made explicit choices
exhibited better calibration and answered a higher proportion of items correctly. The
prediction that overconfidence is in part due to elicitation instruction was not supported
in the study. The observed confidence ratings were invariant to elicitation framing
conditions. In other words, participants in the negative framing condition were equally
likely to underestimate the probability as those that overestimated the probability in the
positive framing condition.
Sneizek, et al. (1990) developed post hoc explanations for their unexpected
results. These authors proposed a cognitive heuristic process model that expands the
propositions of Koriat, et al. (1980) to justify the unexpected results. They posited that
the appropriateness of confidence depends on the extent to which unbiased search of both
confirming and discontinuing evidence is engaged for all alternatives. These authors
speculated that in the choice condition, participants may have searched for both
confirming and disconfirming evidence regarding both alternatives. This may have
resulted, according to the authors, in greater depth of processing of information of the
less preferred alternative, thereby reducing the confidence for the initial preferred
alternative. For the arbitrary cue condition, seeing a circled alternative may have focused
participants’ attention on the preselected alternative. As a result, participants searched
their memories only for confirming evidence of the preselected alternative and thereby
increased the perceived likelihood of that alternative being correct. Furthermore, it is
likely that focusing attention on one alternative may decrease the likelihood for
consideration of pros and cons of the other alternative. In essence, these authors argue
that cueing an alternative increases biased information search on the preselected

12

alternative and decreases the amount of information search on the unchosen alternative,
and in consequence, overconfidence occurs in the direction of the preselected alternative.
In summary, contrary to these authors’ initial prediction of the effect of choice on
confidence judgments, choice did not increase overconfidence. In fact, the results
indicated that it weakened the phenomenon. A study by Ronis and Yates (1987) also
investigated the effect of choice on confidence judgments. These authors also made the
same prediction as Sniezek et al (1990) regarding the effect of choice on confidence
judgments, and they also obtained similar findings.
Ronis and Yates (1987) investigated the effects of subject matters and assessment
method on confidence. The purpose of the study was to determine the generalizability of
overconfidence within the general knowledge domain to the realm of forecasting and the
extent to which different confidence assessment methods contribute to probability
judgment accuracy. These authors suggest that perhaps the mere act of choosing an
answer may influence the probability judgment process. In support of this view, these
authors borrowed the propositions made from the self-perception theory (Bern 1967, cited
in Ronis & Yates, 1987) and an early version of the theory of cognitive dissonance
(Brehm & Cohen, 1962, cited in Ronis & Yates, 1987; Festinger, 1957, cited in Ronis &
Yates, 1987). Both theories, according to these authors, posit that the mere act of
choosing a course of action will increase attractiveness of the chosen action and decrease
attractiveness of the other alternatives. In other words, the perception of an attractive
course of action increases as the result of having been personally involved in making that
choice. When self is the agent of selection, the cognitive perception of attractiveness is
biased toward one’s choice of action. These authors argue that this difference between
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two-step (choose then judge) and one-step (judge) methods may account for the
discrepancy between tasks requiring general knowledge questions and those tasks
requiring the prediction of future events. Explicitly choosing an alternative prior to
assigning a probability for that choice increases the attractiveness of the chosen
alternative, and may have inadvertently contributed to the observed overconfidence in the
laboratory.
In sum, these authors examined the consistency of probability judgments across
different subject matter contexts and assessment methods. Specifically, they predicted
that participants in the two-step method condition (choose then judge) would exhibit
higher overconfidence than those in the one-step method condition (judge) because of the
increasing attractiveness of the chosen alternative.
To test this hypothesis, participants were instructed to answer 51 questions in two
domains: general knowledge and outcomes of upcoming professional basketball games.
Participants were 128 students from a local community university. The three probability
assessment methods used in the study were choice-50 method, no choice-100 method,
and choice-100 method. In the choice-50 method, participants first selected one of the
two possible alternatives and then assigned a probability from .50 to 1.00 that the chosen
alternative was correct. In the no choice-100 method, one of the two possible alternatives
was precircled. Participants were informed with that the precircled alternative was
x determined randomly by a coin toss. Participants in the no choice-100 method condition
simply rated the probability from 0.00 to 1.00 that the precircled alternative was correct.
Finally, in the choice-100 method, participants first selected one of the two possible
alternatives and then assigned a probability from 0.00 to 1.00 that the chosen alternative
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was correct. To compare across data from no-choice 100 method and the other
assessment methods, data from the no-choice method were recoded by the computer
based on the following rules: If the probability assigned was greater than .50, the
participant was coded with choosing the precircled alternative and assigning the
probability. If the probability assigned was below .50, the participant was coded with
choosing the alternative that was not precircled, and the new assigned probability is
determined by subtracting the indicated probability from 1.00.
Ronis and Yates (1987) obtained similar results as to Sniezek et al. (1990) in their
study regarding the effect of choice on confidence. Contrary to these authors’ initial
expectation, confidence and overconfidence measures were highest with the no-choice100 method, lowest with the choice-100 method, and choice-50 was somewhere in
between the two irrespective of topic effect. Although probability judgments exceeded
proportions correct by 9.8% in the choice-100 method condition, the difference was
almost double that amount (16.5%) in the no-choice-100 method condition. In addition,
participants in both choice method conditions demonstrated better calibration and higher
accuracy than participants in the no-choice-100 method condition. Further analyses
revealed that participants in the no-choice-100 method condition were more likely to
agree with the precircled alternatives. They assigned higher probability to the precircled
alternatives than did participants in both choice conditions. This particular finding
suggest a possibility of cueing effect from the precircled alternatives.
In an attempt to reconcile the inconsistency between their initial prediction and
their empirical data, Ronis and Yates (1987) offered two plausible explanations. First, the
methodological artifacts could have partially accounted for the observed outcome. It is
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possible that the precircled alternatives had a cueing effect even though participants were
informed that the decision about which answer was circled was derived by chance. From
that perspective, participants in the no-choice condition may have suspected that the
preselected alternatives were not circled arbitrarily. This cueing effect could lead to
increases in overconfidence observed in this study. The second explanation is similar to
that provided by Sniezek et al. (1987). The precircled alternatives may have led to
selective attention on one alternative which reduces the likelihood of considering
confirming and disconfirming evidence for the other alternative. In addition, focusing
attention on one alternative would bias the direction of information search on the
alternative such that one would tend to generate confirming evidence in support of that
alternative.
In summary, Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis and Yates (1987) investigated the
effect of choosing on confidence judgments. The two studies made the same initial
prediction that choosing would increase overconfidence in choice. Sniezek et al. (1990)
suggest that the search and evaluation o f evidence following an explicit choice would be
biased by a personal commitment to one’s choices, and therefore, overconfidence should
occur when self is the agent of selection. Ronis and Yates (1987) argue on the basis of
self-perception theory and cognitive dissonance theory that freely choosing a course of
action should increase the attractiveness of that chosen action and decrease the
attractiveness o f the alternative action. Contrary to the predictions these authors had
made, the data were in the opposite direction. Both authors developed post-hoc
explanations in an attempt to explain why arbitrary cue condition resulted in more
overconfidence. Both authors argued that the circled alternative focused participants’
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attention and memory search on the preselected alternative. As a result, they speculated
that participants searched their memories only for confirming evidence of the preselected
alternative and thereby increased the perceived likelihood of that alternative being
correct. Furthermore, focusing attention on one alternative decreases the likelihood for
considering pros and cons of the other alternative. In essence, these authors argue that
cueing an alternative increases biased information search on the preselected alternative
and decreases the amount of information search for the unchosen alternative, and in
consequence, overconfidence occurs in the direction of the preselected alternative.
Therefore, these authors ruled out their initial hypothesis that choice evoked more ego
concerns and therefore the overconfidence bias.
In a more recent study, Yates, Lee, and Shinotsuka (1996) quoted the two studies
above as evidence against using a self-esteem mechanism as an explanation of
overconfidence in general knowledge. Yates et al. (1996) claimed that a self-esteem
account for overconfidence should result in weaker overconfidence in the single-stage, no
choice condition than in the standard two-stage condition. They argued that if self-esteem
was the explanatory mechanism for overconfidence, choice between alternatives should
“induce ego-involvement that would be threatened if the choice turned out to be wrong”
(p. 145). The fact that choice does not increase overconfidence, according to Yates et al.
(1996), is direct evidence against the self-esteem account of overconfidence.
Despite relatively consistent findings, there are some limitations to the studies
reported by Ronis and Yates (1987) and Sniezek et al. (1990). One note of criticism
toward these two studies was the manner in which their studies treated choice as
synonymous with ego-involvement, and subsequently, personal commitment. Choice
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served as a proxy for ego-involvement and personal commitment in their studies. Authors
from both studies recognized the potential mediating effect of self-esteem/ego
involvement between choice and confidence judgments in their initial hypotheses.
Sniezek et al (1990) directly included the term “personal commitment” in their
hypothesis. With Ronis and Yates (1987), the term “personal commitment” is applied
from self-perception theory and cognitive dissonance theory. Cognitive dissonance
theory, for example, is indistinguishable from motivation to maintain consistent and
favorable self-evaluation. Festinger (1957), as well as Brehm & Cohen (1962), made the
claim that the essential conditions for arousal of cognitive dissonance are nothing more
than those three concepts: ego-involvement, personal importance, and personal
commitment (cited in Greenwald, 1982). In a review of the ego-involvement literature,
Greenwald (1982) claims that ego-involvement is closely related to personal importance
and personal commitment. A careful examination of Ronis and Yates (1987) and Sniezek
et al.’s (1990) rationale for their designs reveals that choice per se could not lead to an
increase in confidence judgments, but rather the commitment to the chosen course of
action will determine the extent to which choice will lead to increase in overconfidence.
Ronis and Yates (1987) and Sniezek et al. (1990) both indirectly tested their hypothesis
assuming that choice will always lead to ego-involvement and thereby increase
commitment to the choice.
The premise that choice leads to increases in ego-involvement, and ego
involvement influences personal commitment to the chosen course of action warrants
further attention. This premise is not always true and is contingent upon the context in
which the choice is made. One could reasonably argue that ego involvement is low
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regardless of choice condition under the context of general knowledge questions. Does
making a choice on a general knowledge question task sufficiently involve participants
enough to trigger ego involvement? One needs to examine the context as well as the
process to fully understand the picture. Both authors made the speculative attempt to rule
out motivational factors from their initial predictions when data contradicted their
predictions. The authors of both studies argued that a pure cognitive process model was
adequate in explaining their results, and both authors opted for that route. Can one be
sure that a pure cognitive process model is sufficient to capture the true relationship
between choice and confidence judgments?
Another problem with the above two studies has to do with the assumption about
depth o f processing. Is a high degree of processing indicative of unbiased generation and
evaluation of evidence for both alternatives or just the preferred alternative? Authors
from both studies argued that cueing an alternative reduces the amount of cognitive
processing for both alternatives, and thereby increases overconfidence. This is mere
speculation because the amount of cognitive processing was not measured in their
studies. There is no evidence that participants in the choice condition took more time to
complete the task compared to those in the arbitrary cue condition. However, the next
study to be discussed specifically addressed this issue of depth of processing.
Unlike the first two studies, the next study reexamined the effect of choosing on
confidence judgments from a motivational perspective by manipulating the amount of
responsibility in their study. According to Scherer and De La Castro (1998), the task
required for participants in the arbitrary cue condition may have failed to sufficiently
involve the participants and may have reduced their sense of responsibility for the
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accuracy of the pre-selected alternative. Diffusion of responsibility in the arbitrary cue
condition may have resulted in the observed overconfidence in both studies. Therefore, a
cognitive heuristic hypothesis alone may not be sufficient to explain the observed
findings. In their study, the effect of choosing on confidence in choice was examined
while controlling the degree of responsibility for the decision. The prediction was that if
choice leads to less overconfidence, irrespective of the responsibility manipulation, the
heuristic processing explanation would be supported. If, however, the responsibility
manipulation results in no significant difference between choice and arbitrary cue
condition, the heuristic processing explanation would not be supported. Furthermore,
levels of processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) suggests that task completion time
and recall accuracy are indices of depth of processing, with greater time on task and
recall accuracy revealing deeper levels of processing. Thus, in addition to the typical
dependent measures of a calibration study, this particular study included time to complete
the questionnaire and amount of information recalled as indices for depth of processing,
with greater time on task and recall accuracy revealing deeper levels of processing.
Participants were assigned to choice or arbitrary cue conditions as in previous
studies. Degree of responsibility was manipulated using a justification procedure similar
to the Arkes, et al. (1987) and Koriat, et al. (1980) studies. Participants in the justification
condition were instructed to present to the other participants the rationale for their
confidence ratings. In the no justification condition, participants received no instructions
regarding any requirement to justify their confidence ratings.
The Scherer and De La Castro’s (1998) data revealed an interesting pattern of
results. Ironically, the overall pattern of results was inconsistent with those reported by
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Ronis and Yates (1987) and Sniezk et al. (1990) in two respects. Participants in the
choice condition reported significantly higher confidence and overconfidence than
participants in the arbitrary cue condition. Participants in the choice condition were also
not as well calibrated as arbitrary cue participants. These authors speculated on the basis
of these significant but unexpected results that participants in the choice condition may
be more likely to feel committed to the chosen alternative and process information in a
biased fashion to bolster their decisions. This speculation is identical to the initial
reasoning of Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis and Yates (1987).
Contrary to expectations, no significant main effect of responsibility was
observed. The authors noted that the power of the responsibility manipulation was
questionable on the basis of the nonsignificant results obtained from the self-reported on
felt responsibility and task involvement. However, results from the task completion time
revealed that participants in the high responsibility condition spent significantly more
time on the task than those in the low responsibility condition. These authors speculated
that participants in the high responsibility condition processed information more deeply
than subjects in the no justification condition basing this reasoning on levels of
processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). However, no significant main effect of
choice was observed on the task completion time. Task completion time was invariant to
choice manipulation. Furthermore, measure of total recall accuracy revealed a significant
interaction such that the superior recall performance of participants in the arbitrary cuejustification condition compared to those in the arbitrary cue-no justification condition
disappeared in the choice condition. Participants in the choice-justification condition
failed to recall significantly more words compared to participants in the choice-no
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justification condition. The absence o f a responsibility effect in the choice condition is
inconsistent with the cognitive processing model Sniezek et al. (1990) proposed. The
model predicts that having to choose or having to justify one’s decision to others should
induce deeper processing. Superior recall performance should be expected as the result of
deeper processing. Scherer and De La Castro (1998), however, offered two explanations
for such inconsistent finding in the choice-justification condition. They proposed that
although choice and justification might independently facilitate deeper processing of
information, the type of processing elicited may be different for these two factors. From
this viewpoint, the presence of both choice and justification may have led to processing
interference, thereby resulting in poor performance. In other words, the two factors may
differ qualitatively in terms of the types of processing they elicit. Another possibility is
the limited availability of cognitive resources. If choice leads to biased search and
evaluation of information while justification produces social pressure to appear objective,
the two processes might demand a greater portion of cognitive resources in order to
balance each other out. As a result of such a great demand on cognitive resources, there
may be very little left to devote to processing information on the specific item level. This
could contribute to poor recall in memory task.
This study, as the two mentioned before, has its limitations. First, these authors
speculated that their responsibility manipulation may have more closely approximated an
accountability manipulation and not necessarily influenced feelings of felt responsibility.
Based on an extensive review of the research dealing with responsibility, accountability,
and identifiability, Potter and Scherer (1998) made the distinction among these three
constructs. The consensus in the literature is that accountability implies giving an account
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for or justifying one’s opinion whereas responsibility seems to imply “some degree of
ownership of result of outcomes that is not necessarily implied by accountability (p. 51).”
Identiflability, on the other hand, simply refers to whether or not the response is
identifiable or traceable. The construct of interest in the Scherer and De La Castro (1998)
study is clearly accountability, rather than responsibility. This erroneous label o f the
construct could potentially explain the nonsignificant results obtained for the felt
responsibility measure and the task involvement measure of self-reported. The felt
responsibility measure was not significant mainly because it is not a valid measure of
accountability. In addition, not only were participants accounted for their confidence
judgments, their confidence judgments were also traceable and identifiable. The
interactive effect of accountability and identifiability may have contributed to the
observed findings.
Although the accountability manipulation resulted in deeper level of processing, it
may or may not have evoked ego-involvement to the extent that these authors were
hoping. Scherer and De La Castro (1998) also questioned the strength of their
accountability manipulation which required participants to justify their probability
estimates to a group of peers who knew each other. They raised the possibility that the
manipulation might have been strengthened by requiring justification to someone with
power over important outcomes.
The inconsistency and discrepancy in the literature suggests that the relationship
between choice and confidence is more complicated than once thought. Scherer and De
La Castro (1998) speculated on the basis of unexpected results that participants in the
choice condition may be more likely to feel committed to the chosen alternative and
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process information in a biased fashion to bolster their decisions. If this explanation is
tenable, how can these findings be reconciled with those obtained by Ronis & Yates
(1987) and Sniezek et al. (1990)? To fully understand the effect of explicit choice on
confidence judgment, one must consider the mechanisms involved when explicit choice
is made. Specifically, the extent to which freely choosing a course of action could lead to
overconfidence in that chosen action. The author has noted in the criticism of these three
studies that the underlying motivational effect of ego-involvement has to be present in
order for choice to exert its influence on commitment. Commitment to a choice may
ultimately influence confidence judgments through biased generation and evaluation of
evidence for that chosen action. Therefore, in the following section, I will review studies
on ego involvement to further our understanding of this phenomenon.
Overview of Ego-involvement
In a review of ego-involvement theory and research, Greenwald (1982) posited
that the construct of ego-involvement can be understood from three different
perspectives. The three conceptual interpretations of ego-involvement are: (a) concern
about evaluation by others, (b) concern about self-evaluation, and (c) personal
importance. Concern about evaluation by others is similar to what is known as evaluation
apprehension in that the participants were instructed that the tasks to be performed were
to be scored to measure a skill or ability, usually intelligence. Concern about selfevaluation is similar to constructs o f self-esteem threat and achievement orientation. The
difference between concern about evaluation by others and concern about self-evaluation
is that the evaluator is oneself rather than an observer. However, to the extent that one
may consider self-esteem as closely connected with the opinions of others, the distinction
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will be minimized. Finally, personal importance can be characterized as a function of the
number of personal values and the strength of those values attached to a cognition or
belief.
Greenwald (1982) concludes his review by proposing an alternative view of egoinvolvement. He argues that the diversity in the conceptual interpretations of egoinvolvement can be formulated and integrated into a simple view of ego-involvement as
the engagement of an ego task. Ego tasks simply refer to activities aimed at achieving
pervasive and enduring personal goals. The three common ego tasks are impression
management, self-image management, and value management, which correspond to the
three conceptual interpretations respectively. From this viewpoint, it is clear that egoinvolvement can be induced in an experiment by transforming an otherwise boring,
unimportant task, such as responding to a series of general knowledge questions, into an
ego task. Greenwald (1982) noted that this could be achieved by instructing the
participant that the items on the task provide a clear measure of intelligence or some
other valued traits. The next section will discuss two recent studies on ego-involvement.
Specifically, the effect of ego-involvement on cognitive information processing is
delineated and implication of ego-involvement on confidence in choice is noted.
Graham and Golan (1991) examined motivational influences on cognition,
specifically the effects of task involvement, ego involvement, and depth of information
processing on encoding and recall of information. The purpose of the study was to
examine how an individual’s motivational state influences learning. In the study, 5th and
6th grade children were randomly assigned to an ego-focused condition, task-focused
condition, or a control group. Children received 60 three- to five- letter words
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manipulated by the level of processing required at encoding and retrieval (shallow vs.
deep). Ego-involvement was induced by focusing children’s attention on their self
perceived ability or their ability relative to others. Children, in the ego=involvement
condition were instructed that how well they do on the task provides the researcher
information as to how good they are at the task relative to other kids of their age. The
study found that ego involvement resulted in poorer recall of information only at deeper
levels of processing. These authors discussed the possibility that the amount of mental
effort required could result in such finding. They claim that deep processing entails
greater elaboration and greater cognitive effort as opposed to shallow processing. From
this perspective, it appears that ego involvement may interfere with the cognitive effort
needed for deeper levels of information processing. While this tendency may generalize
to the adult population, this study was conducted using children. The actual effect may
attenuate with an adult population.
The results of this particular study dovetail quite well with the observed results
from the Scherer and De La Castro (1998) study and the explanation they provided.
Similarly, they observed that participants from the choice-justification condition
performed poorly on a recall task. Combining the results from the two studies, it seems
plausible that the justification manipulation may have inadvertently transformed an
unimportant task of general knowledge questions into an ego task. The resulting egoinvolvement on the part of participants in the high justification condition may have
interfered with cognitive effort needed to process deeper information, as in the case
where participants were asked to make an explicit choice.
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Conway and Howell (1989) examined the hypothesis that ego involvement leads
to positive self-schema activation and to a positivity bias in information processing. The
task involved in the study has a depth of processing task, which required participants to
judge words according to cue questions that corresponded to different processing levels.
The positive self-schema activation was assessed with a recall task following the depth of
processing task. The types of word recall, according to these authors, may reflect the
underlying cognitive processes of information. The recall words processed at the self
referent level, for example, would simply reflect the influence of the self-schema. In this
study, ego-involvement was induced by having participants anticipate taking a difficult
test of intelligence. Participants heard an audio recording of 48 adjectives (27 positive
and 27 negative) presented at 5-s intervals. Participants first rated each adjective in terms
of its descriptiveness and favorability. A self-favorability score was computed for each
objective by multiplying these two ratings. A positive score would be indicative of selfdescriptive and favorable or not self-descriptive and unfavorable. In addition, participants
judged each adjective using a yes/no scale on either self-referent level (describe you?),
semantic level (means the same as/opposite of?), or phonemic level (sounds like?). The
prediction was made that ego involved participants would recall a greater number of
positive and fewer negative words processed at the level that evokes the affective
meaning of the words. Furthermore, the activation of positive self-schema would result in
a positivity bias in information processing. The positivity bias was expected to emerge at
all levels of processing except the phonemic because it does not evoke affective meaning.
The rationale, according to these authors, is that self-schemata can facilitate the
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processing and recall of consistent material (self-descriptive and favorable) as well as
inconsistent material (not self-descriptive and unfavorable).
The positivity bias hypothesis was supported from the results of recall frequency.
Ego-involved participants generally recalled a greater number of positive and a smaller
number of negative words than noninvolved participants. Additional analyses revealed

\
that this difference is greatest at the semantic level. Contrary to expectation, the
difference was not significant for the self-referent level. In other words, ego-involved
participants did not recall a greater number of positive and a smaller number of negative
words than noninvolved participants at the self-referent level. The same results were
observed for self-favorability score. In general, the data supported the notion that egoinvolvement leads to greater activation of positive self-schema and a positivity bias
except for negative words processed at the self-referent level. The pattern of means
across three levels and across word valence, in terms of self-favorability score, was
consistent with the positivity interpretation. In an attempt to address the inconsistency,
Conway and Howell (1989) speculated that the ego-involvement manipulation may have
increased the salience or accessibility of participants’ self-concept. Because people have
the tendency to view themselves favorably, an increase in salience of self-concept could
account for the unexpected high recall of positive words at the self-referent level. There
is another explanation for the unexpected results. The unexpected results at the self
referent level could be products of a serious methodological artifact. With regard to the
definition of ego-involvement, Greenwald (1982) noted that the procedure of asking
participants to judge the self-relevance of various stimuli has the potential effect of
enhancing memory for those stimuli. This procedure in itself has shown to produce ego-
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involvement. He even coined this particular ego task as “memory management”. From
this perspective, it is likely that processing information at the self-referent level evokes
ego-involvement. In this case, the manipulation of ego-involvement was contaminated
with self-referent level of processing. The results supported this explanation. In general,
the study provides empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that ego-involvement
\

.

.

.

leads to greater activation of positive self-schema and a positivity bias. This particular
finding has a profound implication on the effect of choice on confidence judgments .
More specifically, this finding provides direct evidence of the underlying processes and
mechanisms that maybe involved in confidence judgments.
The Present Investigation
Purpose. The purpose of the study was to examine how motivational factors
interact with cognitive biases to influence confidence judgments. Review of the effect of
choice on confidence judgments suggests an avenue to study the joint effect of
motivational factors and cognitive biases on confidence judgments. In particular, the
present study dealt with the prediction of how motivational factors such as egoinvolvement interact with cognitive biases involved in making choices to increase
overconfidence in general knowledge questions. Inconsistency in the literature on the
effect of choice on confidence judgments warrants further examination of the topic.
No study to date has systematically examined the mediating effects of egoinvolvement and commitment on the relationship between choice and confidence
judgments. The researcher argues that explicit choice alone does not lead to
overconfidence. Choice per se could not have resulted in an increase in confidence
judgments, but rather the commitment to the chosen course of action determines the
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extent to which choice will lead to increase in overconfidence. The premise that choice
leads to increase in ego-involvement, and ego-involvement influences personal
commitment (to the choice) is addressed in this study. To the extent that choice leads to
increase in ego-involvement, and personal commitment (to the choice), one should
observe overconfidence in choice. Therefore, in addition to choice, this study examined
the specific effect of ego-involvement and personal commitment on confidence
judgments. The inclusion of ego-involvement and personal commitment should provide a
theoretical contribution to the existing research on confidence judgments. Moreover, the
two constructs may have practical implications for understanding how to minimize
overconfidence.
Predictions and rationale. The first objective was to examine the effect of choice
on confidence judgments. The researcher predicted that the pure cognitive heuristic
model proposed by both Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis & Yates (1987) should be at
work in the absence of ego-involvement. There is no reason to believe that choice would
lead to higher confidence judgments if participants’ egos were not involved during the
task. Therefore, it is likely that the participants will focus on the precircled alternative
and engage in biased generation and evaluation o f information. Higher confidence
judgments and overconfidence should be expected as the result of selective attention to
the precircled alternative.
Hypothesis 1: Participants who make an explicit choice before assigning a
confidence rating will exhibit lower confidence and lower overconfidence
compared to those who do not make an explicit choice before assigning a
confidence rating.

30

The second goal was to evaluate the lone effect of ego-involvement on confidence
judgments. Previous work on ego-involvement has demonstrated how ego-involvement
leads to biased information processing. Graham and Golan (1991) observed that egoinvolvement resulted in poorer recall of information at deeper levels of processing.
Conway and Howell (1991) found that ego-involvement led to greater activation of
positive self-schema and a positivity bias. Combining the results from the two studies, the
researcher expects ego-involvement to bias the generation and evaluation of confirming
and disconfirming evidence. This bias would therefore lead to higher confidence
judgments and overconfidence.
Hypothesis 2: Participants who are ego-involved will exhibit higher confidence
judgments and overconfidence compared to those who are not ego-involved in the
task.

The third objective was to determine whether ego-involvement moderates the
relationship between choice and confidence judgments. The inconsistent results on the
effect of choice on confidence judgments were reported in the previous discussion.
Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis and Yates (1987) found that participants in the choice
condition assigned lower confidence judgments and exhibited lower overconfidence
compared to participants in the arbitrary cue condition. Scherer and De La Castro (1998),
however, obtained the opposite results from their study. Participants in the choice
condition assigned higher confidence judgments and were more overconfident compared
to participants in the arbitrary cue condition. The researcher argues that the inconsistency
between these studies may be due to the erroneous assumption of choice in the context of
general knowledge questions. Choice was thought to automatically evoke ego-
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involvement and personal commitment by those authors under the context of general
knowledge questions. However, the researcher suggests that the personal commitment
and ego-involvement are not sufficiently aroused in the choice condition under such
context. Scherer and De La Castro’s (1998) manipulation of accountability, however,
may have inadvertently evoked participants’ ego-involvement in their study to produce
the inconsistent results. Therefore, when ego-involvement is taken into account, the
researcher predicts that choice will lead to higher confidence and overconfidence only
when ego-involvement is high. High ego-involvement will result in high personal
commitment to the choice, and subsequently influence the generation and evaluation of
evidence for the choice, resulting in overconfidence.
Hypothesis 3: Participants who make an explicit choice will exhibit higher
confidence judgments and higher overconfidence only when their ego-involvement
is high. Under conditions o f low ego involvement, participants who make an
explicit choice will exhibit lower confidence judgments and lower overconfidence
compared to those who are in the arbitrary cue condition.

The fourth objective of this study was to determine whether choice alone is
predictive of personal commitment. Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis and Yates (1987)
made the assumption that explicit choice will automatically evoke personal commitment
to the choice. However, the researcher argues that the relationship between choice and
personal commitment is contingent upon the context within which the choice is made.
The premise that choice automatically evokes personal commitment is very questionable
in the context of general knowledge questions. The researcher seeks to invalidate the
premise that choice in itself is sufficient to evoke personal commitment in the context of
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general knowledge questions. Thus, the researcher predicts that in the context of general
knowledge questions, personal commitment will be low irrespective of choice.
Hypothesis 4: Participants who make explicit choices will exhibit the same degree
o f personal commitment to the choice compared to those who are in the arbitrary
cue conditions.

The fifth objective was to determine whether ego-involvement is positively
related to personal commitment. The notion that ego-involvement is closely related to
personal commitment has long been established in the literature on ego-involvement
(Rhine & Polowniak; 1971; Greenwald, 1982). From the perspective of self-perception
theory and cognitive dissonance theory, the drive to maintain or enhance one’s feeling of
self-esteem is strongest when the situation is related to the person’s self-concept. Egoinvolvement is an antecedent of personal commitment. Therefore, when participants are
ego-involved in a task, they will exhibit high personal commitment to the task in order to
minimize dissonance.
Hypothesis 5: Participants who are ego-involved will exhibit higher personal
commitment compared to those who are not ego-involved.

The sixth objective was to examine the interactive effect of choice and egoinvolvement on personal commitment in the context of general knowledge questions.
Hypothesis 1 states that making a choice on a general knowledge question task will not
sufficiently arouse participants to trigger personal commitment to the choice. Hypothesis
2 claims that ego-involvement is an antecedent of personal commitment, Therefore, the
researcher predicts that ego-involvement will moderate the effect of choice on personal

commitment. In other words, choice will lead to personal commitment only when
participants are ego-involved.
Hypothesis 6: Participants who make an explicit choice will exhibit higher
personal commitment compared to those who are in the arbitrary cue condition
only when they are ego-involved in the task.

Lastly, the researcher tested the direct relationship between personal commitment
and confidence judgments to determine whether personal commitment mediates the
relationship between choice and confidence judgments.
Hypothesis 1: It is expected that there will be a positive relationship between
personal commitment and confidence judgments and overconfidence, such that
participants who are high in personal commitment will engage in biased
information search and therefore have higher confidence judgments and
overconfidence than those who are low in personal commitment.

METHOD
Overview of Methodological Strategy
In order to test the hypotheses set forth in the prior chapter and contribute a
programmatic study of overconfidence, it was necessary to develop a task similar to that
used in prior research: a general knowledge test. To extend this research and effectively
manipulate ego involvement, it was necessary to conduct preliminary studies to enhance
both the strength and the believability or face validity of the ego-involvement
instructions. Further, preliminary testing was needed to ensure the believability and
appropriate difficulty of the general knowledge test. The methodology and results for two
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preliminary studies are discussed, followed by the methodology employed in the primary
study.
Study 1
Purpose
The purpose of the first preliminary study was to determine which type of
instructions accompanying the general knowledge test would induce the highest level of
ego-involvement. Specifically, the researcher sought to identify an ego-involving name
for the test that was seen as predictive of an outcome deemed as most important to
participants. The two criteria used to select the high ego-involvement manipulation were:
(a) the extent to which the test name or what it was purportedly measuring was egoinvolving; and (b) the extent to which performance on the particular test was predictive of
a positive future outcome.
Participants
Thirty University of Nebraska at Omaha undergraduate psychology students (17
women and 13 men) volunteered to participate. The age of the participants ranged from
18 to 45 (M = 22.7, SD = 6.73). Volunteers received extra credit for their participation
and were treated in accordance with the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct” (American Psychological Association, 1992).
Stimulus Materials and Procedures
Participants were presented with a set of questions, which measured the level of
ego-involvement they experienced if they were to complete a test of intelligence, cultural
literacy, literacy IQ, and general knowledge. The ego-involvement scale consisted of a
set of five 7-point scale questions (see Appendix A). Example items on the scale were:
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“How involved would you be in taking a test o f intelligence/cultural literacy/literacy
IQ/general knowledge?” and “7o what extent is it important fo r you to do well on a test
o f intelligence/cultural literacy/literacy IQ/general knowledge ?”

The second part of the questionnaire required participants to evaluate the extent to
which they believed that each term was predictive of the following items: (a) professional
success, (b) general success in life, (c) success in college, and (d) interpersonal success.
Example items were: ‘To what extent is performance on a test o f general knowledge
predictive o f professional success?” and ‘T o what extent is performance on a test o f
general knowledge predictive o f general success in life?”

Results and Discussion
A satisfactory internal consistency reliability estimate o f the scale was obtained,
( a = .87). The means and standard deviations of the ego-involvement scale for the four
terms are presented in Table 1. The two terms that evoked the greatest ego-involvement
were general knowledge (M = 5.66, SD = 1.26) and intelligence (M = 5.58, SD = 0.89).
A correlated t-test was performed to compare the means for the two terms. No significant
difference was observed between the terms general knowledge and intelligence on the
ego-involvement scale, t (29) = .55, p = ns. Among the four terms, general knowledge
was tentatively chosen due to the fact that the actual test was comprised of general
knowledge questions.
The second part of the analysis focused only on the extent to which general knowledge
was perceived to be predictive of important outcomes: (a) professional success, (b)
general success in life, (c) success in college, and (d) interpersonal success. A one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no differences among the terms
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Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations of the Ego-involvement Scale

M

SD

General Knowledge

5.66

1.26

Intelligence

5.58

0.89

Literacy IQ

5.35

1.16

Cultural Literacy

4.25n

1.03

Measure

Note. A 7-point scale was used for all measures.
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professional success (M = 5.33, SD = 1.35), general success in life (M = 5.46, SD =
1.22), success in college (M = 5.40, SD = 1.28), and interpersonal success (M = 4.90, SD
= 1.35). The results revealed that general knowledge was seen as equally predictive of the
four outcomes, F (3, 27) = 2.47, p = ns. To determine which outcome to utilize, the
researcher relied on post-experimental discussions with participants who generally felt
that general success in life was the most important outcome that would be predicted from
general knowledge.
The two criteria of generating an ego-involving term that would be predictive of
an important future outcome were satisfied using general knowledge. Thus, the
instructions to be used in the high ego-involvement condition were as follows: The
follow ing activity is a test o f general knowledge. Research has shown that the
performance on this test is linked to general success in life. ”

Study 2
Purpose
The two objectives of Study 2 were to: (a) develop a test that was moderate in
difficulty, and (b) develop a questionnaire that participants would believe to be a measure
of general knowledge. A substantial amount of research has shown that overconfidence is
affected by item difficulty. Analyses have revealed that overconfidence and poor
calibration are exaggerated for difficult tasks and items, whereas the overconfidence
effect is minimized and even turned into systematic underconfidence for easy tasks and
items. Therefore, the goal was to develop a questionnaire that would minimize this
“hard/easy effect.” In addition, Study 2 allowed the researcher to determine whether the
average test score was comparable to scores obtained in prior research that utilized a
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general knowledge questionnaire. The second objective ensured that the knowledge
categories of the overall general knowledge test were perceived by participants as being
good measures of general knowledge rather than indices of some other construct.
Moreover, the researcher wanted to avoid inadvertently inducing a negative affective
state by including questions that were perceived as offensive. The clarity and wording of
items was also tested in Study 2.
Participants
Fifty-three University of Nebraska at Omaha undergraduate psychology students
(38 women and 15 men) volunteered to participate. The age of the participants ranged
from 18 to 43 (M = 23.09, SD = 5.24). Volunteers received extra credit for their
participation and were treated in accordance with the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists
and Code of Conduct” (American Psychological Association, 1992).
Stimulus Materials
A 120-item, two-alternative general knowledge questionnaire was developed as
the primary stimulus in Study 2. Using information contained in the Dictionary of
Cultural Literacy (2nd Ed) (Hirsh, Kett, & Trefil, 1993), a set of 120 items was written on
a wide array of general knowledge topics: (a) the bible, (b) mythology and folklore, (c)
proverbs, (d) idioms, (e) world literature, (f) philosophy and religion, (g) literature in
English, (h) conventions of written English, (i) fine arts, (j) world history to 1550, (k)
world history since 1550, (1) American history to 1865, (m) American history since 1865,
)

(n) world politics, (o) American politics, (p) world geography, (q) American geography,
(r) anthropology, psychology, and sociology, (s) business and economics, (t) physical
sciences and mathematics, (u) earth sciences, (v) life sciences, (w) medicine and health,
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and (x) technology. Ten topics were randomly selected from this pool of topics. The
selected ten topics were: (a) the bible, (b) idioms, (c) philosophy and religion, (d)
literature, (e) fine arts, (f) American politics, (g) anthropology, psychology, and
sociology, (h) business and economics, (i) life sciences, and (j) medicine and health. The
author and two assistants independently generated two easy and two difficult questions
for each topic. Hard and easy questions were generated based on the subjective
judgments of the author and two assistants. A total of 12 questions were generated for
each topic.
The post-task questionnaire required participants to use a 7-point scale to rate
each of the ten categories on the extent to which each category was a representative
component of general knowledge (see Appendix B). Participants were also asked to use a
7-point scale to indicate the extent to which the overall test was a good measure of
general knowledge. Example of these items were “As you worked on the questionnaire,
to what extent do you agree that this test is a good measure o f overall general
knowledge? ” and ‘To what extent do you agree that all o f the categories o f information
asked in this questionnaire are equally important determinants o f on e’s general
knowledge ?”

Procedures
For the general knowledge questionnaire, participants were asked to read through
each item and determine which of the two alternatives was correct. Upon finishing the
general knowledge questionnaire, participants indicated their opinions on the categories
chosen for the general knowledge test as well as the overall test.
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Results and Discussion
The overall mean score was obtained for the 120-item general knowledge
questionnaire, (M = 91.84, SD = 9.31). The mean score translated to a difficulty index of
.77. The mean item difficulty index for each category is presented in Table 2. The
difficulty index was comparable to the general knowledge questionnaire Ronis and Yates
(1987) used in their study.
Ratings of each category are provided in Table 3 . Overall, the ten categories were
perceived as important components of general knowledge. Furthermore, the many
participants agreed that the questionnaire was a measure of general knowledge, (M =
4.58, S D = 1.38).
Based on the comments participants made about the questionnaire, the Bible
category was deleted from the primary study. The Bible category was perceived as
offensive and inappropriate as a category of general knowledge by some participants.
Several participants mentioned that the Bible category made the general knowledge test
appear “ethnocentric.” In addition, a few of the items were deleted from the primary
study on the basis of incorrect or confusing wordings.
Primary Study
Overview
Participants included undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the
University of Nebraska at Omaha who received extra credit in exchange for their
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to a 7 (choice vs. arbitrary cue) X 2
(high ego-involvement vs. low ego-involvement) between-subject factorial design.
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Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations of Difficulty Index for Knowledge
Categories

Category

M

SD

Bible

0.80

0.27

Idioms

0.83

0.20

Philosophy and Religion

0.76

0.22

Literature

0.72

0.22

Fine Arts

0.61

0.24

American Politics

0.79

0.18

Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology

0.79

0.27

Business and Economics

0.79

0.18

Life Sciences

0.81

0.18

Medicine and Health

0.77

0.22

Note. The difficulty index ranges from 0 to 1.0
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Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Ratings on Knowledge Categories

Category

M

SD

Bible

4.83

1.68

Idioms

4.53

1.68

Philosophy and Religion

5.06

1.38

Literature

5.06

1.56

Fine Arts

4.71

1.57

American Politics

5.50

1.44

Anthropology, Psychology, and
Sociology

5.60

1.10

Business and Economics

5.72

1.20

Life Sciences

5.47

1.44

Medicine and
Health

5.94

1.28

Note. Judgments on knowledge categories were made on a 7-point scale.

Two factors were manipulated in the experiment: choice and ego-involvement.
The two levels of the choice factor consisted of choice and arbitrary cue. The choice
condition was identical to the typical two-stage method of the calibration study. The
participants first chose among alternatives and then assigned confidence ratings to each
chosen alternative. In the arbitrary cue condition, participants simply assigned a
confidence rating for each of the arbitrarily-circled alternatives.
Participants
One hundred University o f Nebraska at Omaha undergraduate psychology
students (76 women and 24 men) volunteered to participate. The age of the participants
ranged from 18 to 48 (M = 23.49, SD = 6.18). Volunteers received extra credit for their
participation and were treated in accordance with the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists
and Code of Conduct” (American Psychological Association, 1992).
Stimulus Materials
A booklet was constructed for the primary study. The booklet contained the
following materials in order: (a) a set of appropriate instructions for each treatment
condition (including two sample items), (b) a brief explanation of confidence estimates,
(c) a 45-item, 2-alternative general knowledge test, (d) a post-task questionnaire to assess
level of commitment to choice, and (e) a demographic information questionnaire. All
stimulus materials, with the exception of the general knowledge questionnaire, can be
found in the Appendix section.
A 45-item, two-alternative questionnaire was used as the primary stimulus in this
experiment. Five items were randomly selected from each of the nine remaining
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categories in Study 2. The mean difficulty index, based on Study 2, was calculated for the
new 45-item, (M = .72, SD = .07).
Manipulation of Independent Variables
Choice. Level of choice was manipulated by the researcher through task
\

instructions. In the choice conditions, the questionnaire instructions read: “Read each
knowledge question and then try to determine which o f the two alternatives is correct.
Answer by circling either alternative A or alternative B. Then indicate the probability
that the alternative you chose is correct by circling any number between 50 % and 100%.
Note that you can circle any o f the 6 probability estimates provided on the scale. To help
you use the scale appropriately, anchors are provided fo r the 50% and 100%. However,
please circle any probability e s t i m a t e Participants in the arbitrary cue conditions

received the same two alternatives as participants in the choice conditions. However, one
of the two alternatives was arbitrarily precircled in an alternating sequence, similar to the
procedure employed by Sniezek et al. (1990). Instructions for the arbitrary cue condition
read: "DO NOT ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. Just read each question, then try to
determine the probability that the circled alternative is correct by circling any number
between 0% and 100%. Note that you can circle any o f the 11 probability estimates
provided on the scale. To help you use the scale appropriately, anchors are provided fo r
the 0%, 50% and 100%. However, please circle any probability estimated

A study conducted by Brake, Doherty, and Kleiter (1996) examined the test-retest
reliability in probability estimates and found them to be around .70 to .82. These authors
concluded that probability estimates in general knowledge questions were reliable.

Ego-involvement. The degree of ego-involvement was manipulated through
information provided about the nature of the task. The ego-involvement manipulation
focused participants’ attention on their self-perceived ability. Based on the results from
Study 1, the ego-involvement condition participants were told that “the following activity
is a Test o f General Knowledge. The questions are drawn from various categories o f
general knowledge such as (a) Idioms, (b) Religion and Philosophy, (c) Fine Arts, (d)
American Politics, (e) Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology, (f) Business and
Economics, (g) Life Sciences, and (h) Medicine and Health. Research has shown that the
performance on this test is linked to General Success in Life.” In the low ego-

involvement conditions, participants were informed nothing more than the procedural
information. No information on general knowledge test and its relation to general success
in life was mentioned in the low ego-involvement conditions.
Dependent Measures
Brier (1950) proposed an overall measure of the accuracy o f probabilistic
judgments, known as the “Brier score.” To provide separate measures of different aspects
of judgment accuracy, several researchers have proposed decompositions of the Brier
score (Murphy, 1973). Therefore, the Brier score is divided into several components. This
study included the Brier score, some components of the above mentioned
decompositions, and several other descriptive statistics. The study focused on five
measures that are particularly important and easy to interpret: accuracy, mean confidence,
mean over/underconfidence, the Brier score, and the calibration index.
Accuracy. Accuracy is defined as the correctness of the responses. The formula
for accuracy is the number o f questions answered correctly over the total number o f
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questions. Accuracy was calculated for each participant. For example, if a participant
answered 50 questions correctly out of a total possible 100 questions, the accuracy level
would be .50. Accuracy ranged from 0 to 1.
Mean confidence. Mean confidence is how sure the participant is with his/her
given answers. Participants recorded a probability estimate after each knowledge
question. Each probability estimate ranged from .50 to 1.00. The probability estimate
indicated the participants’ level of confidence that the alternative the chose was correct.
The mean confidence was derived by averaging the probability estimates for the 45
questions. The mean confidence was calculated for each participant.
Mean over/underconfidence. Mean over/underconfidence is a measure o f the
accuracy of confidence judgments. To calculate the mean over/underconfidence, the
mean confidence was subtracted from the accuracy measure for each participant.
Overconfidence occurred when the difference between accuracy and mean confidence
resulted in a positive value and underconfidence occurred when the difference between
accuracy and mean confidence resulted in a negative value. Accurate confidence
judgments occurred when the difference between the two resulted in a zero value. For
example, if a participants answered 70% (.70) of the questions correctly and indicated
that he/she was on the average 80% (.80) confident that his/her answers were correct, the
mean over/underconfidence measure would be . 1 0 .
Brier score. The Brier score is an overall measure of judgment accuracy. A low
Brier score is indicative of good judgment. The formula for the Brier score (abbreviated
PS because it is also known as the mean probability score) is provide below:
p s = I ( / '- < 0 2 / n

47

Throughout the form ulas,/represents the subjective probability estimate, d
represents the outcome (0 for incorrect, 1 for correct), and N represents the total number
of judgments made.
Various decompositions of PS have been developed to offer insight into the
components of judgment accuracy. The most frequently used decomposition of PS is the
Murphy (1973) decomposition. The Murphy decomposition has three components: (a) the
calibration index (Cl), (b) the discrimination index (DI), and (c) the variance of d :
PS = Cl - DI + Var(<7)
Please refer to Appendix C for a detailed review of the computational formulas used for
each of the indices.
Calibration index. The calibration index is a measure of the extent to which
judgments at various levels of confidence (e.g. 60%, 70%, and 80%) match the accuracy
level for that confidence category. Calibration simply refers to the extent to which the
subjective confidence closely matches the relatively frequency of correct answer. The
calibration of judgments is measured by grouping each of a set of confidence judgments
into subjective probability categories. The mean accuracy is then subtracted from each
confidence category. Evidence of poor calibration exists when the subjective probabilities
for a given confidence category differs greatly from the percentage correct of that
category. The participant is called overconfident for categories in which reported
confidence exceeds percentage correct. For example, if a participant answered 60% of the
questions correct for the questions he/she had assigned 80% level of confidence. This
would indicate that the participant is overconfident for the 80% confidence category.
Conversely, underconfident occurs for categories in which reported confidence is less
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than the percentage correct. For instance, if a participant answered 90% of the questions
correct for the questions he/she had assigned 70% level of confidence. This would
indicate that the participant is underconfident for the 70% confidence category. Perfect
calibration occurs when questions assigned a confidence o f 70% are answered 70% of the
time correctly. If this were true, we say that the individual’s probability judgments are
well calibrated.
Commitment
Commitment to choice is operationally defined as those personal and behavioral
mechanisms that bind individuals to consistent patterns o f choices over time. This
definition is influenced by the work of Kim, Scott and Crompton (1997). Two measures
of commitment will be outlined.
Behavioral commitment measure. To measure the behavioral component of
commitment to choice, participants were given the opportunity to go back and review all
of their answers and make the changes they deemed appropriate at the end of the task.
Behavioral commitment was measured by the number of changes participants made when
given the opportunity to do so. Therefore, the operational measure o f behavioral
commitment was the frequency of changes. A low frequency of changes o f the chosen
alternatives reflects a higher degree of commitment toward those chosen alternatives. A
high frequency of changes of the chosen alternatives is indicative of a low level of
commitment to the previously chosen alternatives. To calculate the behavioral
commitment measure, experimenter tabulated the number o f changes each participant
made when given the opportunity to do so at the end of the experiment.
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Self-reported commitment scale. A five-item scale was included in the study to
measure the level of commitment to choice for each participant. Participants provided
ratings for each item using a 7-point scale. The items were adopted from the work of Kim
et al. (1997). (see Appendix D). Examples of items were: “Orc this task, it is a big deal if I
make a mistake with the circled answer ”, and ‘7 am so confident with the circled answer
that I d o n ’t even bother going back making any changes. ”

Procedures
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups.
Participants were run individually in the research lab. All participants were presented
with a 45-item general knowledge questionnaire. Participants first played the audio
instructions tape, which contained the manipulation instructions, and followed along with
the written instructions. Participants were asked to work through each question in the
order presented, and were given as much time as necessary to complete the task.
Following completion of the task, participants were given the opportunity to
review their answers and make any changes they deemed appropriate. Then, participants
completed the post-task questionnaire, which included self-reported commitment scale
and manipulation check items, and provided demographic information.
After all of the materials were returned, participants were debriefed regarding the
true purpose of the research. They were then given extra credit and thanked for their
participation.
The experimenter tabulated the number o f changes each participant made when
given the opportunity and recorded the number on the data sheet.
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Analyses

Comparisons among treatment conditions were conducted using a separate
univariate two-way analysis of variance for each dependent variable
Results
Manipulation check. Participants completed an ego-involvement manipulation
check questionnaire upon finishing the task (see Appendix E). The internal consistency
reliability estimate of the scale was obtained, (a = .76). The reliability estimate was
considered satisfactory based on the recommendation of Nunnally and Bernstein (1994).
Responses of high ego-involved and low ego-involved participants to the manipulation
check items were compared using an independent t-test. Although the means were in the
predicted direction (M = 5.33, SD = .87 for low ego-involvement condition, and M =
5.36, SD = .90 for high ego-involvement condition), no significant differences were
found between high ego-involved and low ego-involved participants, t (98) = -.175, p =
ns. Participants in the low ego-involvement condition considered the task just as egoinvolving as those in the high ego-involvement condition. Post experimental
conversations with the participants revealed that many of them thought the experiment
was “interesting” and were eager to learn how they scored on the questionnaire. It is
plausible the ego-involvement manipulation may have had an effect on those in the high
ego-involved condition but the nature of the task may have inadvertently evoked too
much ego-involvement in those in the low ego-involvement condition.
Dependent Measures
Confidence judgments. Five indices were computed for each participant,
including accuracy, the mean confidence, the mean over/underconfidence, the Brier
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score, and the calibration index. As in Ronis and Yates (1987), participants’ choice was
inferred from probabilities in the arbitrary cue condition. The circled alternative was
assumed to be the participant’s choice if the probability assigned was greater than .5. If
the probability assigned was less than .5, the uncircled alternative was assumed to be the
participant’s choice. Circled alternatives assigned probabilities of .5 were randomly
divided into chosen and unchosen halves. Therefore, the five indices computed for
participants in the arbitrary cue condition are those that would be obtained if choices
were consistent with probabilities assigned for the arbitrarily circled alternative. The
means and standard deviations on these measures for each condition are shown in Table
4. The overall mean of accuracy was found to be .70 or 70% correct.
Analysis of variance was performed to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 (see Table 59). For Hypothesis 1, the researcher predicted that the pure cognitive heuristic model
proposed by both Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis & Yates (1987) would be at work in the
absence o f ego-involvement. Therefore, higher confidence and overconfidence measures
would be expected as the result of selective attention to the precircled alternative. As
predicted, a significant main effect of choice was found on the mean
over/underconfidence measure and the Brier score. There was a significant choice effect
on the mean over/underconfidence measure, F (1/96) = 9.16, p < .05. Arbitrary cue
participants exhibited more overconfidence than participants in the choice condition. A
similar result was obtained for the Brier score. A main effect for choice was observed,
such that the arbitrary cue participants were less accurate with their confidence judgments
than the choice participants, F (1, 96) = 5.84, p < .05. In addition, a marginal main effect
of choice was found for the calibration index, F (1, 96) = 3.52, p = .06. Arbitrary cue
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Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations on Performance Measures as a Function of Choice and
Eeo-Involvement

Condition 3

Choice-Hi Ego
M
SD
Choice-Low Ego
M
SD

Accuracy

Mean
Mean
Brier Score
Confidence Overconfidence

Calibration
Index

0.73
0.09

0.80
0.07

0.06
0.07

0.19
0.05

0.04.
0.03

0.70

0.81
0.09

0 .1 0
0 .1 0

0.21

0.06

0.04
0.03

0.84
0.08

0.15
0.09

0.23
0.06

0.05
0.04

0.81

0 .1 2

0 .1 0

0.08

0.23
0.05

0.05
0.03

0 .1 0

Arbitrary cue-Hi
Ego

M

0 .6 8

SD

0.08

Arbitrary cueLow Ego

M
SD
Note. an = 25.

0.70
0.09
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Table 5

Analysis of Variance for Accuracy

Source

df

F

E

Choice (C)

1

2.63

0 .1 0

Ego-involvement (E)

1

0.33

0.57

C xE

1

1.62

0.21

96

(0.008)

S within-group error

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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Table 6

Analysis of Variance for Mean Confidenc

Source

df

F

E

Choice (C)

1

1.78

0.18

Ego-involvement (E)

1

0.23

0.63

C xE

1

0.79

0.38

96

(0.007)

S within-group error

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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Table 7

Analysis of Variance for Mean Over/underconfidence

Source

df

F

e

Choice (C)

1

9.16

0.01

Ego-involvement (E)

1

0 .0 2

0.90

C xE

1

4.93

0.03

96

(0.007)

S within-group error

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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Table 8

Analysis o f Variance for the Brier Score

Source

df

F

E.

Choice (C)

1

5.84

0 .0 2

Ego-involvement (E)

1

0.79

0.38

C xE

1

0.89

0.35

96

(0.003)

S within-group error

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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Table 9

Analysis of Variance for the Calibration Index

df

F

E

Choice (C)

1

3.52

0.06

Ego-involvement (E)

1

0.01

0.90

C xE

1

1.11

0.30

96

(0.0008)

Source

S within-group error

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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participants were less well calibrated than the choice participants. Further, a marginal
main effect of choice was observed for mean accuracy, F (1, 96) = 3.52, p = .10. Choice
participants answered more items correctly on the test than participants in the arbitrary
cue condition. For the confidence measure, there was no significant difference among
the treatment conditions, F (1, 96) = 1.78, p = ns.
Hypothesis 2 stated that participants in the high ego-involvement condition would
exhibit higher confidence judgments and overconfidence compared to those in the low
ego-involvement condition. Contrary to the prediction, no main effect was observed for
ego-involvement on any of the five indices. High ego-involved participants did not
exhibit higher confidence and overconfidence than low ego-involved participants. The
findings could be a result o f the weak ego-involvement manipulation as well as the high
ego-involving nature of the task.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants making explicit choices would exhibit
higher confidence judgments and higher overconfidence only if they were highly egoinvolved in the task. Under conditions of low ego involvement, it was predicted that
participants making explicit choices would exhibit lower confidence judgments and lower
overconfidence compared to those in the arbitrary cue condition. A significant choice X
ego-involvement effect was indeed observed on the mean over/underconfidence measure,
however, in the opposite direction of the prediction, F (1, 96) = 4.93, p < .05. The
significant interaction indicated that the choice main effect held for participants in the
high-ego involvement condition, but was nonexistent for participants in the low-ego
involvement condition. In other words, in the high ego-involvement condition, arbitrary
cue participants exhibited higher overconfidence than choice participants. There was no
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significant difference between arbitrary cue participants and choice participants in the
low ego-involvement condition. Figure 1 depicts in graphic form the relationships among
the means.
Commitment. Commitment to choice was measured using a self-reported
commitment scale and a behavioral commitment measure. The internal consistency
reliability estimate of the self-reported commitment scale revealed that the scale was
unreliable (a = .43). The analysis revealed that alpha would be .56 if item 3 were deleted
from the scale. The following analyses were conducted with item 3 deleted from the selfreported commitment scale. The means and standard deviations for both commitment
measures are presented in Table 10.
Analysis of variance procedures were used to test Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 (see
Table 11 and Table 12). Unfortunately, the homogeneity of variance test revealed
significant differences in within-cell variance across cells for the behavioral commitment
measure (Levene’s Test, F (3, 96) = 2.81,j) = .04). Although the assumption of
homogeneity of variance was violated for the behavioral commitment measure, the
analysis of variance was still conducted based on the recommendations from Stevens
(1996). Stevens (1996) asserts that analysis of variance is robust to the violation of the
assumption of homogeneity of variance as long as group sizes are equal or approximately
equal. Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis and Yates (1987) both made the assumption that
explicit choice will automatically evoke personal commitment to the choice. This study
directly tested this assumption. For Hypothesis 4, the researcher predicted that
participants making explicit choices would exhibit the same degree of commitment to
choice compared to those evaluating precircled alternatives in the arbitrary cue condition
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Figure 1. Mean overconfidence as a function of choice and ego-involvement.
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Table 10

Means and Standard Deviations on Commitment Measures as a Function o f Choice and
Ego-involvement

Condition3

Self-reported
Commitment

Behavioral
Commitment

Choice-Hi Ego
M
SD

4.11
0.91

2.52
2.71

Choice-Low Ego
M
SD

4.36
1.23

3.12
2.69

Arbitrary cue-Hi
Ego
M
SD

3.78
1.36

1.40
1.41

Arbitrary cue-Low
Ego
M
SD

3.91
1.06

2.28
2.22

Note. an = 25. The possible range for the self-reported commitment measure is from 1 to
7 , with 7

representing the highest commitment and 1 representing the lowest

commitment. Behavioral commitment is the number of changes made in responding to
general knowledge questionnaire. The possible range for the behavioral commitment
measure is from 0 to 45, with 0 representing the highest level of behavioral commitment
and 45 representing the lowest level of behavioral commitment.
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Table 11

Analysis of Variance for Self-Reported Commitment

Source

df

Choice (C)

1

1.27

0.26

Ego-involvement (E)

1

0.01

0.93

CxE

1

0.74

0.39

95

(19.41)

S within-group error

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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Table 12

Analysis of Variance for Behavioral Commitment

Source

df

F

E

Choice (C)

1

4.45

0.03

Ego-involvement (E)

1

2.53

0.13

CxE

1

0.09

0.76

95

(0.01)

S within-group error

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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under the context of general knowledge questions. The results were mixed with regard to
this hypothesis. A significant main effect o f choice on behavioral commitment was
obtained, F (1, 95) = 4.45, p < .05. Choice participants were more likely to change their
answers than arbitrary cue participants. This finding indicated that arbitrary cue
participants were more committed to their choice than choice participants. On the other
hand, no significant main effect of choice on the self-reported commitment measure was
found, F (1, 95) = 1.26, p = ns.
Contrary to Hypothesis 5, participants in the high ego-involvement condition did
not exhibit higher personal commitment compared to those in the low ego-involvement
condition. There was no ego-involvement main effect on either the behavioral
commitment measure, F (1, 95) = 2.54, p = ns, or the self-reported commitment measure,
F (1, 95) = .01, p = ns. The same was found for Hypothesis 6 . No significant interaction
was observed for choice and ego-involvement. Ego involvement did not moderate the
effect of choice on commitment to choice.
Lastly, Hypothesis 7 was tested using Pearson product-moment correlation. A
correlation matrix was generated (see Table 13) for each of the confidence indices and
the two commitment measures. It was expected that there would be a positive relationship
between personal commitment and confidence judgments and overconfidence such that
participants high in personal commitment would engage in biased information search and
therefore report higher confidence judgments and overconfidence than those who were
low in personal commitment. A significant correlation between the behavioral
commitment measure and mean confidence was obtained, r = - .37, p < .05. This
indicated that mean confidence increases as behavioral commitment increases. Moreover,
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Table 13

Intercorrelations Among Performance Measures and Commitment
Measures

Measures

1. Accuracy
2. Mean confidence
3. Mean over/underconfidence
4. Brier score
5. Calibration index
6.

Self-reported commitment

7. Behavioral commitment
Note. N = 100.
* P < .05
** j) < .01

1

6

7

4Q**

-.13

-.25*

-.09

4Q**

-.16

-.37*

73 * *

78**

-.19

-.1 0

—

69**

.10

.18

—

.04

.02

—

.13

2

3

4

4 7 **

-.56**

8 i**

—

4 7 **
—

5

_

—
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a significant correlation was observed between accuracy and behavioral commitment
measure, r = - .25 »E < .05. Accuracy increases as behavioral commitment increases. The
self-reported commitment measure was not found to correlate with any of the five
confidence indices.
Supplementary analyses. To test whether or not the precircled answers in the
arbitrary cue condition served as a cue to the correct answer for participants in the
arbitrary cue condition, one additional measure was derived and subjected to analysis of
variance: the proportion of times participants agreed with the precircled answer. The
analyses revealed that arbitrary cue participants agreed with the precircled answer 49% of
the time (M = .49, SD = .09). No significant difference was found between high egoinvolved participants and low ego-involved participants, t (48) = -.523, p = ns.
Participants were then categorized into two groups based on their score on this measure.
Participants with scores higher than .50 were classified in the cueing group (n = 25) while
participants with scores less than .50 were classified in the non-cueing group (n = 25).
The effect of cueing on behavioral commitment was examined, t (48) = .295, p = ns. No
significant effect of cueing was observed on the behavioral commitment measure.
Discussion
Overview
The primary goal of this research was to use ego-involvement to explain the
inconsistent findings in the literature on the effect of choice on confidence judgments.
The assumption of commitment to one’s choice was explicitly examined in this research.
The following discussion will begin with a summary o f findings, both predicted and
unexpected. Plausible explanations and the underlying mechanisms of the results are then
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offered, along with limitations of the study. Finally, implications and suggestions for
future research are presented.
Summary of Results
The present study extended the research of Sniezek et al. (1989), Ronis and Yates
(1990), and Scherer and De La Castro (1998) by examining the moderating effect of egoinvolvement on choice and confidence judgments.
Effect of choice on confidence judgments. Hypothesis 1 predicted that choice
would affect confidence judgments, with arbitrary cue participants exhibiting higher
confidence judgments and higher overconfidence. The rationale for this prediction was
based on the cognitive heuristic model proposed by both Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis
& Yates (1987). In the absence of ego-involvement, higher confidence and
overconfidence measures should be expected as the result of selective attention to the
precircled alternative. Hypothesis 1 was supported by three of the four confidence
indices: overconfidence measure, the Brier score, and the calibration index. Participants
in the arbitrary cue condition were more overconfident, less accurate with their
confidence judgments, and therefore less calibrated.
Effect of ego-involvement on confidence judgments. Hypothesis 2 predicted an
effect of ego-involvement on confidence judgments, such that participants in the high
ego-involvement condition would exhibit higher confidence judgments and higher
overconfidence compared to those in the low ego-involvement condition. The logic is
that previous research has demonstrated that ego-involvement leads to biased information
processing. Therefore, the researcher expected ego-involvement to bias the generation
and evaluation of confirming and disconfirming evidence. Hypothesis 2 was not
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supported for any measures of confidence judgments. Contrary to the prediction,
participants in the high ego-involvement condition did not exhibit higher confidence and
overconfidence than participants in the low ego-involvement condition. This particular
finding could be the result of the weak ego-involvement manipulation used in the study
as well as the high ego-involving nature of the task for all participants.
Effect of choice and ego-involvement on confidence judgments. Hypothesis 3
predicted an interactive effect of choice and ego-involvement on confidence judgments,
such that participants making explicit choices would exhibit higher confidence judgments
and higher overconfidence only when they are highly ego-involved in the task. In the low
ego-involvement condition, participants making explicit choices would exhibit lower
confidence judgments and lower overconfidence compared to those evaluating precircled
alternatives in the arbitrary cue condition. Recall that previous research has found
inconsistent results on the effect of choice on confidence judgments. It was hypothesized
that ego-involvement would moderate the effect of choice on confidence judgments and
reconcile the discrepancy in the literature. Ego-involvement was found to moderate the
effect of choice on the overconfidence measure; however, the effect was in the opposite
direction of the prediction. In the high ego-involvement condition, arbitrary cue
participants exhibited higher overconfidence than choice participants. There was no
significant difference between arbitrary cue participants and choice participants in the
low ego-involvement condition.
Effect of choice on commitment. Hypothesis 4 predicted that in the context of
general knowledge questions, participants making explicit choices would exhibit the
same degree of personal commitment to choice as those evaluating precircled alternatives
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in the arbitrary cue condition. The present author disagrees with Sneizek et al.’s (1990)
assumption that explicit choice will automatically evoke personal commitment. The
relationship between choice and personal commitment is contingent upon the context
within which the choice is made. The premise that choice automatically evokes personal
commitment is questionable in the context of general knowledge questions. The
prediction was that in the context of general knowledge questions, personal commitment
would be low irrespective of choice. The results were mixed with regard to this
hypothesis. A choice effect was found for the behavioral commitment measure, but not
for the self-reported commitment measure. The nonsignificant finding on the selfreported commitment measure may be attributable to the unreliable nature of the
measure. Therefore, contrary to the initial expectation, arbitrary cue participants were
more committed to their choice than participants in the choice condition.
Effect of ego-involvement on commitment. Hypothesis 5 predicted an effect of
ego-involvement on commitment, with participants in the high ego-involvement
condition exhibiting higher commitment than the low ego-involving participants. The
prediction was based on previous works of self-perception theory and cognitive
dissonance theory. Ego-involvement was thought to be an antecedent of personal
commitment. Hypothesis 5 was not supported for the behavioral commitment measure or
the self-reported commitment measure.
Effect o f choice and ego involvement on commitment. Hypothesis 6 predicted
that ego-involvement would moderate the effect of choice on personal commitment, such
that choice would lead to higher personal commitment only when participants were ego-
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involved. Hypothesis 6 was not supported in the study. Ego involvement did not
moderate the effect of choice on commitment to choice.
Relationship between confidence judgments and commitment. Hypothesis 7
predicted a positive relationship between confidence judgments and commitment, such
that participants high on commitment would engage in a biased information search and
therefore report higher confidence judgments and overconfidence than those who were
low in commitment. Again, the results were mixed with regard to this hypothesis. A
positive relationship was obtained between the behavioral commitment measure and
mean confidence. This indicated that mean confidence increases as behavioral
commitment increases. However, the self-reported commitment measure was not found
to correlate with any of the five confidence indices.
Interpretations of Findings
Ego-involvement manipulation. The manipulation check revealed that there was
no significant difference in the degree of ego-involvement between the high egoinvolvement group and the low ego-involvement group. It is imperative to understand
what exactly occurred in the two ego-involvement conditions because all of the
hypotheses were predicated on the assumption that ego-involvement manipulation
worked. There are three plausible interpretations for the nonsignficant finding. First and
foremost, the finding may be a true reflection of what occurred between the high egoinvolvement condition and the low ego-involvement condition. The ego-involvement
manipulation may have been contaminated with the nature of the task. It is plausible the
ego-involvement manipulation may have had an effect on those in the high ego-involved
condition but the nature of the task may have inadvertently evoked too much ego-
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involvement in those in the low ego-involvement condition. Participants in the low egoinvolvement condition were just as ego-involved in the task as those in the high egoinvolvement condition. However, if this was the case, why did the results indicate a
significant interaction between ego-involvement and choice on confidence judgments? If
the ego-involvement manipulation failed to differentiate between the high egoinvolvement group and the low ego-involvement group, the same main effect of choice
would be expected in the low ego-involvement condition. This was not observed in the
study. Therefore, this interpretation could not be tenable.
The second interpretation of the finding rests on the notion of demand
characteristics. The specific type of demand characteristics that could have accounted for
the observed results is the “good subject effect.” The good subject effect occurs when
participants attempt to respond in such a way as to confirm the hypothesis, even when
they are guessing what the hypothesis is (Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1997). Given that these
participants were rewarded with extra credit for their participation, it is very plausible
that participants may perceive being ego-involved in the task as socially desirable. As the
result, they may have indicated being highly involved in the task even when that was not
the case. In other words, a good subject might have wanted to show the experimenter that
he/she was taking the task seriously by indicating that on the manipulation check items.
The norm of reciprocity may have caused participants to provide false information with
regard to their ego-involvement in the task.
Relatedly, the demographic information revealed that the sample consisted of 76
female students and 24 male students. Given the nurturing nature of women, it is
conceivable that women are more prone to compliance than men. If such an assumption
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were tenable, it would only enhance the “good subject effect.” However, if the good
subject effect were indeed the cause of the observed finding, arguably one would expect
the same from the self-reported commitment scale. Specifically, the good subject effect
should result in high ratings on the self-reported commitment scale. This was not
observed in the study. It is not clear if there is indeed a good subject effect present in the
study.
Lastly, it is plausible that there may be different types of ego-involvement.
Although the results indicated that participants in the low ego-involvement were just as
ego-involved as those in the high ego-involvement, it could be argued that the source of
their ego-involvement differed. Participants in the low ego-involvement condition may
have been ego-involved due to the nature of the task. Participants may have perceived the
task o f completing a general knowledge questionnaire to be self-relevant. To an extent,
one could argue that participants in the low ego-involvement might have considered the
general knowledge questionnaire to be an ability test, such as an intelligence test. Perhaps
participants in the high ego-involvement condition were more influenced by the salient
ego-involvement manipulation. Recall that the ego-involvement instructions emphasized
that performance on the general knowledge test is predictive of general success in life.
Study 1 showed that most participants considered success in life to be an important future
outcome. It is plausible that the ego-involvement instructions may have evoked a core
value that is highly regarded by participants. If there is indeed different types o f egoinvolvement, the present manipulation check items could not have differentiated among
the different types of ego-involvement. As the result, both groups appeared to be high on
the global ego-involvement scale.
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Effects of choice and ego-involvement on overconfidence. Contrary to the
prediction of more overconfidence under choice in the high ego-involvement condition,
participants who made explicit choices were significantly less overconfident than those
who did not make explicit choices. One possibility is that participants in the arbitrary cue
condition may have believed that the precircled alternatives were not circled arbitrarily.
Participants may have perceived the precircled alternatives as either the correct answers
or the incorrect answers. Such expectation could lead to increases in overconfidence such
as those observed in the study. However, it is doubtful that a belief that all or none o f the
precircled alternatives were correct could have resulted in the observed findings given
that supplementary analyses showed no systematic relations between precircled
alternatives and the actual choices made. Participants “chose” arbitrarily circled
alternatives 22 out of 45 times, or 49% of the time.
Another possible approach to understanding the unexpected overconfidence
demonstrated by arbitrary cue participants under high ego-involvement is the cognitive
heuristic process model of confidence assessment. The cognitive heuristic process model
posits that the overconfident assessment is a byproduct of biased generation and
evaluation of evidence. The cognitive heuristic explanation for results obtained in the
present study would be that in the arbitrary cue condition, seeing a circled alternative
may have focused participants’ attention on the preselected alternatives. As the result,
participants searched their memories only for confirming evidence o f the preselected
alternative and thereby increased the perceived likelihood of that alternative being
correct. Furthermore, it is likely that focusing attention on one alternative may decrease
the likelihood for consideration of pros and cons of the other alternative. This may have

74

resulted in the higher overconfidence observed in the arbitrary cue condition. Conversely,
in the choice condition, participants may have searched for both confirming and
disconfirming evidence regarding both alternatives. This may have resulted in greater
depth of processing of information of the less preferred alternative, thereby reducing the
confidence for the initial preferred alternative. However, given that the underlying
cognitive processes were not directly measured in the present study, this interpretation is
merely speculative. Further, the pure cognitive heuristic model could not explain why the
overconfidence o f arbitrary cue participants disappeared in the low ego-involvement
condition.
Perhaps a better explanation is a motivational one. Under the high egoinvolvement condition, it is plausible that there was greater involvement in the task.
Individuals perceived the task to be important to their self-concept. However, there is a
distinction between whether one makes explicit choices and assessing confidence and
merely assessing confidence on preselected alternatives. First of all, the degree of
responsibility may be different between the two groups. Participants who made explicit
choices may have felt that they were fully responsible for their answers, whereas
responsibility may have been perceived as shared by those in the arbitrary cue condition.
Arbitrary cue participants may not have felt that they were responsible for the precircled
answers. The task merely asked them to rate the precircled answers. This issue was also
raised in the Scherer and De La Castro (1998) study. If this assumption is true, the logic
follows that the consequences of making a mistake are much higher for those who made
explicit choices. Because the self is the agent of selection and the task is important to the
self-concept of the individual, it is plausible that the individual would do all he/she could
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to protect his/her self-concept. Under the high ego-involvement condition, self-concept
would be threatened if the choice turned out to be wrong. Being 100% sure that the
answer was correct and finding out that he/she was completely wrong is not a good
feeling. In fact, it makes the person feel bad. The fear of being wrong may have resulted
in the observed low overconfidence in the choice condition. On the other hand, arbitrary
cue participants may be more removed from the chosen answers, and thereby the fear of
being wrong was not so much of a concern. For example, assume that a newly hired
manager is required to come up with a budget proposal for the year. The new manager
can come up with a budget proposal from scratch or use the previous year’s budget from
a former manager of the department. Chances are that if the manager starts from scratch,
he/she would not be very confident with the budget. Conversely, if the manager had a
sample budget proposal from a previous year, he/she could confidently determine which
items are relevant to his/her department. Therefore, using a sample budget proposal as a
guide will result in higher confidence about the final budget proposal.
In reality, both the cognitive heuristic model and the motivational explanation
could interact to account for the observed results. It is plausible that under a high egoinvolvement condition, the fear o f being incorrect may have forced choice participants to
devote more attention to both alternatives. Participants then engaged in a less biased
information search for both confirming and discontinuing evidence. As the result,
overconfidence was minimized in the choice high ego-involvement condition.
Conversely, the effect o f cognitive heuristic may have been accentuated for the arbitrary
cue participants in the high ego-involvement condition.
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More difficult to interpret is the lack of main effect of choice in low egoinvolvement condition. Recall that participants in the low ego-involvement condition
reported a moderate level of ego-involvement rather than a low level o f ego-involvement.
Based on the manipulation check data and post-task conversations, participants were
found to be ego-involved in the task regardless of treatment conditions. Thus, the obvious
!

explanation is that the manipulation of ego-involvement was not sufficiently strong to
tease apart the effect of choice under the low ego-involvement condition. As the result,
conclusions on the null effect of choice in the low ego-involvement should be made with
caution. The effect of choice on confidence judgments observed in the high egoinvolvement condition could reverse under a true low ego-involvement environment.
This study directly tested the assumption of commitment to one’s choice that
Sniezek et al. (1990) and Ronis and Yates (1987) discussed in their research.
Commitment was thought to be an antecedent of confidence. The predicted positive
relationship between the two constructs was observed only for behavioral commitment
measure. This finding could be explained by the unreliability of the self-reported
commitment measure. The lack of correspondence between measures of confidence
judgments and measures of commitment, on the other hand, is difficult to interpret. It is
possible that behavioral commitment and self-reported commitment could be completely
different constructs. This implies that the measures are tapping into different component
o f commitment. Another possibility could be that participants did not have good insight
about their behaviors. Nisbett and Ross (1980) claim that one should not make inferences
based on self-reported measures because results of self-reported measures often times do
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not match the actual behaviors. Therefore, the observed finding could be attribute to this
inconsistency.
Limitations
This study, like all others, has its limitations. First, the manipulation of egoinvolvement was not sufficiently strong. The effect of the manipulation was minimized in
the low ego-involvement condition. Providing no instructions in the low ego-involvement
condition did not result in the expected low ego-involvement on the part of the
participants. Instead, participants in the low ego-involvement condition were moderately
ego-involved in the task. The general knowledge questionnaire was sufficient to evoke
ego-involvement in the low ego-involvement condition. Future research needs to
deliberately control for ego-involvement in the low ego-involvement group.
Further, the between-subject design and issues of sampling raise several concerns.
The study opted for a between-subjects approach because the concern was more with the
differences between choice and arbitrary cue when ego-involvement is taken into
account. However, it is probable that individual differences in the degree of
overconfidence may have ramifications on the observed results. It is plausible that some
participants are confident or overconfident in almost every situation they encounter,
regardless of choice or ego-involvement. The opposite could also be true. For some
individuals, overconfidence may represent a broad trait that is common to different tasks
and invariant to environmental conditions. For instance, someone could consistently
overestimate the chances of projects being completed within specified time limits despite
of types of project as well as the feedback from past experience.
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It should, of course, be noted that the present sample of participants is composed
entirely of college students, whereas the experimenter has attempted to address the
broader issue of the entire population. College students may be more susceptible to the
ego-involving nature of the task, given that the study was conducted in a research lab on
campus.
Further, the general knowledge^test that was used in the present study was
relatively easy compared to the previous calibration studies. Analyses have revealed that
individuals who answered more items correctly exhibited less overconfidence in general.
In other words, they found a systematic decrease in overconfidence as the percentage
correct increased. This implies that the overconfidence measures may have been diluted
due to this ceiling effect. As the result, that range of overconfidence may not be large
enough to detect a difference between the two ego-involvement conditions.
In addition, the domain of interest is general knowledge questions. The findings
indicated that the domain of general knowledge is highly ego-involving due to self
relevance nature of the task. The extent to which general knowledge can be extended to
other self-relevance tasks remains to be tested. A decision between alternative A or
alternative B on a general knowledge test may or may not be the same as investing
money in company A or company B. Do the same mechanisms apply when an individual
is making a real world decision? Do they engage in the same biased information search?
Implications and Future Research
Several recommendations can be drawn directly from the results of the study.
First, participants in the arbitrary cue and high ego-involvement condition demonstrated
the highest overconfidence. It is likely that judgments may be less accurate when they are
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made under those circumstances. One may wish to avoid making critical decisions under
those conditions. Of all the treatment groups included in the experiment, participants in
the choice and high ego-involvement condition exhibited the least overconfidence. The
latter were more accurate with their probability estimates and better calibrated than all of
the other treatment groups. This suggests that the potential to make poor choices may be
reduced by enhancing ego-involvement.
One of the unexpected findings of the present study was that the general
knowledge questions do evoke ego-involvement in the participants. Even when no
explicit instructions were given to the participants, they still regarded the task as
somewhat ego-involving. This finding suggests that the three previous calibration studies
using general knowledge questions (e.g. Ronis and Yates, 1987; Sniezek et.al., 1990;
Scherer and De La Castro, 1998) may be assumed to be ego-involving and conclusions
across these studies might all be tenable. For all but the Scherer and De La Castro (1998)
study, arbitrary cue leads to more overconfidence than choice. That is, the pattern of
results suggests that making judgments of others’ choices (arbitrary cue) leads to more
overconfidence than making one’s own choices. However, given that Scherer and De La
Castro (1998) were the only ones to manipulate responsibility, future research needs to
clearly delineate the conditions under which overconfidence is most likely to occur.
Interestingly, if one assumes that the nature o f general knowledge questionnaire is
sufficient to evoke ego-involvement, one does not have any information regarding what
goes on under low ego-involvement. The effect o f choice on confidence judgments
observed in the high ego-involvement condition could reverse under a true low egoinvolvement environment. Future research should replicate this study and deliberately
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manipulate ego-involvement instructions to decrease the amount of ego-involvement.
One may want to embed the task of general knowledge questions with some other
research to decrease the amount of attention on the task. Another suggestion, borrowed
from the literature on social loafing, is to make participants believe their responses are
not traceable to them individually. Researchers have found that people tend to exert less
effort when they believe their outputs are anonymous and unidentifiable (Karau &
Williams, 1993; Weldon & Gargano, 1988). This loafing phenomenon has been observed
for physical tasks as well as cognitive tasks (Weldon & Gargano, 1998). As the loafing
research, one could deliberately manipulate the anonymity o f the task and provide
specific information regarding the possibility o f receiving feedback on the task. No
feedback is possible if participants’ responses are anonymous. When participants believe
their outputs are anonymous and unidentifiable, it is likely they will exert less cognitive
effort, thereby decreasing the degree o f ego-involvement in the task. Thus, by ensuring
the anonymity of participants’ responses, one could reduce the self-relevance effect of
scoring people’s general knowledge.
In addition, future study should replicate the present study and include items that
would tease apart different types of ego-involvement. Recall the arguments made earlier,
that the present manipulation check might have omitted items that could potentially
differentiate among different types of ego-involvement. Examining various types of egoinvolvement such as self-relevance ego-involvement, value-based ego-involvement, and
issue-based ego-involvement, could potentially explain the nonsignificant results of egoinvolvement.
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The present findings may have implications on the typical decision making
procedures adopted in most organizations. When decisions are made in organizational
settings, it is often recommended that they be evaluated by a separate person or group of
people before being implemented. This procedure is often justified by the assumption that
a person who was not directly involved in making the decision can offer a more impartial
and therefore more accurate assessment o f its quality. As observed in the current study,
such an assumption may not be true. The secondary group may act in a similar fashion to
those in the arbitrary cue condition and exhibit higher overconfidence than the actual
decision- makers. In fact, Koehler and Harvey (1997) examined confidence judgments
made by actors and by observers and found that actors were significantly less confident in
their answer than were observers. This particular finding is similar to what was observed
in the high ego-involvement condition of the present study. Confidence judgments by
actors and observers may also be moderated by ego-involvement of the task.
Another practical significance of overconfidence is related to developmental
psychology. Based on developmental research, judgments of task-specific, expected
performance (self-efficacy) can affect the activities one chooses to pursue and the extent
of effort devoted to them. Judgments of self-efficacy are made under uncertainty;
therefore, they are subject to the same cognitive constraints such as limited attention and
limited information processing capacity (Switzer & Sniezek, 1991). Overt positive selfevaluation, as discussed at the onset of the study, suggests that judgments of self-efficacy
may reflect overconfidence. Stone (1994) observed that initial self-efficacy judgments
made in cognitively complex tasks are biased toward overestimates of personal ability. In
other words, individuals are overconfident about their personal ability. It is plausible that
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ego-involvement may minimize overconfidence in judgments of self-efficacy, as was the
case of the present study, or ego-involvement may actually exacerbate overconfidence in
judgments of self-efficacy. Research to date has yet to examine this issue. Future research
should include items that explicitly measure judgments of self-efficacy.
Furthermore, the observed findings of the effect of choice on overconfidence in
the high ego-involvement condition may have theoretical implications on the consistent
findings of cross-cultural variations of overconfidence. Research has shown that
overconfidence for general knowledge is stronger in most Asian countries than in
Western countries. Ego-involvement may account for this difference. Specifically,
participants in Asian countries may have perceived the task of general knowledge as less
ego-involving than participants in Western countries. Participants in Western countries
may have acted in accordance with choice participants in the high-ego involvement
condition, and thereby exhibited less overconfidence. On the other hand, the task of
general knowledge may not have sufficiently evoked ego-involvement in Asian
participants, and as the result, they were more overconfident than participants in Western
countries. Future research should attempt to measure the extent to which general
knowledge is perceived as ego-involving by Asians and Westerners and perhaps derive a
more conclusive theory of overconfidence.
Future research should explicitly test the cognitive heuristics model and the
threaten self-esteem explanations. For instance, to test the cognitive heuristics model, one
could attempt to examine the depth of processing through verbal protocol, or items that
ask for explanations of a decision. It is important to explicitly investigate the types of
information people are processing. The threaten self-esteem explanation could easily be
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tested by incorporating some measures of evaluation apprehension. Future research
should directly test for these models to derive a more definitive underlying mechanism
for the overconfidence phenomenon.
Researchers have often assumed that a person who exhibits overconfidence in
general knowledge can be expected to overestimate the quality of his/her knowledge base
and hence sees no need to try to improve it. However, such an assumption has not been
tested empirically. Future research should extend the knowledge questionnaire of the
present study with more items to encompass a broader domain of knowledge. This would
allow researchers to examine whether overconfidence in one knowledge component
could be generalizable to the entire knowledge base as well as overconfidence across
knowledge components.
Conclusion. The present study demonstrated that overconfidence is more likely to
occur when one is assessing the accuracy o f others’ choices rather than one’s own. In
addition, the study suggests that overconfidence may be minimized by enhancing egoinvolvement. Future research should examine different types of ego-involvement and
other moderators of the effect of choice on overconfidence.
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Appendix A
Study 1 Questionnaire
QUESTIONNAIRE A INSTRUCTIONS: The following questions pertain to several
tests. Please answer by circling the number which best describes how you feel about each
test if you were to complete them.
I.

Test of Intelligence
1. How involved would you be in taking a test of intelligence?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Involved
Very
At All
Involved
2. To what extent is it important to you to do well on a test of intelligence?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Important
Very
At All
Important
3. How important is it to you to be correct on a test of intelligence?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Important
Very
At All
Important
4. To what extent do you feel competitive about answering more items on a test
of intelligence correctly than other students’?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Competitive
Very
At All
Competitive
5. Good performance on a test of intelligence is primarily due to my ability.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree

II.

Test of Cultural Literacy
1. How involved would you be in taking a test of cultural literacy?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Involved
Very
At All
Involved
2. To what extent is it important to you to do well on a test of cultural literacy?
2
3
4
5
7
1
6
Not Important
Very
At All
Important
3. How important is it to you to be correct on a test of cultural literacy?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Important
Very
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At All

Important

4. To what extent do you feel competitive about answering more items on a test
of cultural literacy correctly than other students’?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Competitive
Very
At All
Competitive
5. Good performance on a test of cultural literacy is primarily due to my ability.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
III.

Test of General Knowledge
1.

How involved would you be in taking a test of general knowledge?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Involved
Very
At All
Involved
2. To what extent is it important to you to do well on a test of general
knowledge?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Important
Very
At All
Important
3. How important is it to you to be correct on a test of general knowledge?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Important
Very
At All
Important
4. To what extent do you feel competitive about answering more items on a test
of general knowledge correctly than other students’?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Competitive
Very
At All
Competitive
5. Good performance on a test o f general knowledge is primarily due to my
ability.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree

QUESTIONNAIRE B INSTRUCTIONS: The following questions pertain to several
tests. Please answer by circling the number which best describes how you feel about each
test.
Test of Intelligence
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1. To what extent is performance on a test of intelligence predictive
professional success?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Predictive
Very
At All
Predictive
2. To what extent is performance on a test of intelligence predictive
success in life?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Predictive
Very
At All
Predictive
3. To what extent is performance on a test of intelligence predictive
in college?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Predictive
Very
At All
Predictive
4. To what extent is performance on a test of intelligence predictive
interpersonal success?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Predictive
Very
At All
Predictive

of

o f general

o f success

of

Test of Cultural Literacy

1. To what extent is performance on a test of cultural literacy predictive of
professional success?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Predictive
Very
At All
Predictive
2. To what extent is performance on a test of cultural literacy predictive of
general success in life?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Predictive
Very
At All
Predictive
3. To what extent is performance on a test of cultural literacy predictive of
success in college?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Predictive
Very
At All
Predictive
4. To what extent is performance on a test of cultural literacy predictive of
interpersonal success?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Predictive
Very
At All
Predictive
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Test of General Knowledge
1.

To what extent is performance
professional success?
1
2
3
4
Not Predictive
At All
2. To what extent is performance
general success in life?
1
2
3
4
Not Predictive
At All
3. To what extent is performance
success in college?
1
2
3
4
Not Predictive
At All
4. To what extent is performance
interpersonal success?
1
2
3
4
Not Predictive
At All

on a test of general knowledge predictive of
5

6

7
Very
Predictive
on a test of general knowledge predictive of
5

6

5

6

5

6

7
Very
Predictive
on a test o f general knowledge predictive of
7
Very
Predictive
on a test of general knowledge predictive of
7
Very
Predictive
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Appendix B
Post-Task Questionnaire for Study 2
\

Rate the following categories base on the extent to which you think each
category is a good representative of a component of general knowledge. For
example, if you believe that knowledge of Literature is a very important
component of general knowledge, then you should record a 7 on your
scantron sheet. Note that you can have the same value assign to multiple
categories. Please indicate your ratings on the space provided and then
transfer the ratings to the scantron sheet when you are done.

1

2

3

4

Very Unim portant
Com ponent o f
G eneral Knowledge

5

6

7
Very Important
Component o f
General Konwledge

1.

The Bible

2.

Idioms

3.

Philosophy and Religion

4.

Literature

5.

Fine Arts

6.

Am erican Politics

7.

Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology

8.

Business and Econom ics

9.

Life Sciences

10.

M edicine and H ealth
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11. As you worked on the questionnaire, to what extent do you agree that this test
is agood measure of overall general knowledge?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

12. To what extent do you agree that some of the categories asked in the
questionnaire are more representative of general knowledge than others?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

13. To what extent do you agree that some of the item s asked in the questionnaire
are more representative of general knowledge than others?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

14. To what extent do you agree that all of the categories of information asked in
this questionnaire are equally important determinants of one’s general
knowledge?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
D isagree

7
Strongly
Agree

15. To what extent do you agree that all of the item s asked in this questionnaire
are equally important determinants of one’s general knowledge?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

16. Your overall prediction of your performance on this questionnaire (percentage
correct)
1

2

3

4

5

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

6
100%
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Rank the following categories from 1to 10 with 1being the category that
best represents the domain of general knowledge and 10 being the category
that least represents the domain of general knowledge. Note that you cannot
have the same rank assigned to multiple categories. Please indicate your
rankings on the spaces provided and then transfer the rankings to the
scantron sheet when you are done.

17 .___ The Bible
18 .___ Idiom s
19 .___ Philosophy and Religion
20.

Literature

2 1 .___ _Fine Arts
2 2 . ___ A m erican Politics
23.

Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology

2 4 .___ Business and Econom ics
2 5 .___ Life Sciences
2 6 .___ M edicine and Health

Comments. Please record any comments or reactions to the questionnaire in
the space provided.
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Appendix C
Note on Confidence Measures
The computational formulas for the confidence judgments indices presented in
this paper are provided below. A complete treatment of these indices is beyond the scope
of the study, readers should refer to works by Yates (1990, Ronis & Yates, 1987).
Throughout the form ulas,/represents the subjective probability estimate, d represents the
outcome (0 for incorrect, 1 for correct) N represents the total number of judgments made,
and J represents the number o f judgments made within a set of questions with a common

/
The most commonly used index in studies o f calibration is the Brier score. The
Brier score (abbreviated PS because it is also known as the mean probability score) gives
an overall measure o f accuracy in judgment:
PS= Z (/-rf)2/N
Various decompositions of PS have been developed to offer insight into the components
of judgment accuracy. The most frequently used decomposition o f PS are Murphy (1973)
decomposition. The Murphy decomposition has three components: (1) the calibration
index (Cl), (2) the discrimination index (DI), and (3) the variance of d:
PS = Cl - DI + Var(d)
Where
CI = l/N Z N j

(/j -

j) 2

DI =l/N Z N j (</j - «Q2
Var(d) = d ( l - d )
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Appendix D
Self-reported Commitment Scale
1. On this task, it is a big deal if I make a mistake with the circled answer.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

2. I would be upset if the circled answer turned out to be wrong.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

3. I am confident with the circled answer that I don’t even bother going back making
any changes.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

4. I am reluctant to change the circled answers.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

5. Once I made a decision about an answer, I will stick to that decision no matter what.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3
~

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree
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Appendix E
Manipulation Check Questionnaire
1. How involved were you in completing the task?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not Involved
At All

7
Very
Involved

2. To what extent was it important for you to do well on the task?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not Important
At All

7
Very
Important

3. How important was it to you to be correct on the task?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not Important
At All

7
Very
Important

4. To what extent did you feel competitive about answering more items on the task
correctly than other students?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not Competitive
At All

7
Very
Competitive

5. It was important to my self-concept that I do well on the general knowledge
questionnaire.
1
Not Important
At All

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Important
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Appendix F
Demographic Questionnaire
For the following questions, please fill in the numbered on the scantron sheet.

1.

2.

3.

What is your gender? 1 Male
2 Female
What is your race?

Less than high school
High school graduate
Certificate
Dual Certificate

1 - 2 semesters
3 - 6 semesters

7 - 1 0 semesters
more than 10 semesters

3 Junior 4 Senior

How many college courses have you taken?
1 0 - 5 courses
2 6 - 10 courses
3 11 - 20 courses

7.

3
4

Which of the following best describes your academic standing?
1 Freshman
2 Sophomore

6.

5 Some college
6 Associate's Degree
7 Dual Associate's Degree
8 Bachelor's Degree

How many semesters have you been enrolled in at least one college course?
1
2

5.

4 American Indian
5 Asian American
6 Other

What is your highest level o f educational experience?
1
2
3
4

4.

1 Caucasian
2 African American
3 Hispanic

4 21 -3 0 courses
5 31 - 40 courses
6 more than 40 courses

How many psychology courses have you taken?
1 1 - 2 courses
2 3 - 4 courses
3 5 - 6 courses

4 7 - 9 courses
5 1 0 - 1 2 courses
6 more than 12 courses

100

8.

Is English your primary language?

9.

Which number below best represents your difficulty in reading English?
1 None
2 Very little
3 Some

1 Yes
2 No

4 Quite a bit
5 Lots

10.

Are you currently employed?

1
2

Yes
No

11.

Are you married?

1
2

Yes
No

12.

Have you ever been married?

1
2

Yes
No

13.

Do you have children?

1
2

Yes
No

14.

If "yes", how many children do you have?
1 1 child
2 2 children
3 3 children

15.

4 4 children
5 5 or more children

Please indicate your birth date on the lower left hand comer of the scantron sheet.

